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Preliminary Evidence on the Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve System

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  • Shughart, William F, II
  • Tollison, Robert D

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  • Shughart, William F, II & Tollison, Robert D, 1983. "Preliminary Evidence on the Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 291-304, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:73:y:1983:i:3:p:291-304
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2013. "Dispersed communication by central bank committees and the predictability of monetary policy decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 223-244, October.
    2. Salter, Alexander W. & Smith, Daniel J., 2019. "Political economists or political economists? The role of political environments in the formation of fed policy under burns, Greenspan, and Bernanke," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 1-13.
    3. Robert D. Auerbach, 1991. "Institutional Preservation At The Federal Reserve," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 9(3), pages 46-58, July.
    4. Gary Anderson & William Shughart & Robert Tollison, 1988. "A public choice theory of the great contraction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 3-23, October.
    5. William N. Butos, 1986. "The Knowledge Problem under Alternative Monetary Regimes," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(3), pages 849-876, Winter.
    6. David I. Meiselman, 1986. "Is There a Political Monetary Cycle?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 6(2), pages 563-586, Fall.
    7. Iljoong Kim & Inbae Kim, 2005. "Endogenous changes in the exchange rate regime: A bureaucratic incentive model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 339-361, December.
    8. William J. Boyes & William Stewart Mounts JR & Clifford Sowell, 1998. "Monetary and Fiscal Constitutions and the Bureaucratic Behavior of the Federal Reserve," Public Finance Review, , vol. 26(6), pages 548-564, November.
    9. Rob McGregor, 2007. "Federal Reserve transparency: The more things change, the more they stay the same?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 269-273, December.
    10. Kim, Iljoong & Kim, Inbae, 2007. "Endogenous selection of monetary institutions: With the case of discount windows and bureaucratic discretion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 330-350, September.
    11. Eugenia Toma & Mark Toma, 1985. "Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 175-191, January.
    12. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
    13. Alexander W. Salter & William J. Luther, 2019. "Adaptation and central banking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 243-256, September.
    14. Caitlin Ainsley, 2022. "Federal reserve appointments and the politics of senate confirmation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 93-110, January.
    15. Mark Harris & Paul Levine & Christopher Spencer, 2011. "A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 413-442, March.
    16. Caporale, Tony & Winter, Harold, 1998. "Political influence over Supreme Court criminal procedure cases," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 465-475, May.
    17. Richard E. Wagner, 1986. "Central Banking and the Fed: A Public Choice Perspective," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 6(2), pages 519-543, Fall.
    18. Wm. Mounts & Clifford Sowell & James Lindley, 1985. "Rent-seeking over time: The continuity of capture," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 87-94, January.
    19. Alan Reynolds, 1986. "Fed Watching and the Monetary Regime," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 6(2), pages 545-579, Fall.
    20. Louis Rouanet & Peter Hazlett, 2023. "The redistributive politics of monetary policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 1-26, January.
    21. William F. Shughart, 2017. "A Personal Remembrance," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(3), pages 630-636, January.
    22. Caporale, Tony & Grier, Kevin B, 1998. "A Political Model of Monetary Policy with Application to the Real Fed Funds Rate," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 409-428, October.
    23. Stuart Allen & Donald McCrickard & Phillip Cartwright & Charles Delorme, 1988. "The use of inputs by the Federal Reserve System: An extended model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 205-214, December.
    24. Loretta J. Mester, 2003. "Applying efficiency measurement techniques to central banks," Working Papers 03-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    25. Jordan, Jerry L. & Luther, William J., 2022. "Central bank independence and the Federal Reserve's new operating regime," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 510-515.

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