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Inflationary bias of the Federal Reserve System : A bureaucratic perspective

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  • Toma, Mark

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  • Toma, Mark, 1982. "Inflationary bias of the Federal Reserve System : A bureaucratic perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 163-190.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:10:y:1982:i:2:p:163-190
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    Cited by:

    1. Centi Jean-Pierre, 1999. "Money And Credit In An Openended Universe," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2-3), pages 1-28, June.
    2. Barry Eichengreen & Peter M. Garber, 1991. "Before the Accord: U.S. Monetary-Financial Policy, 1945-51," NBER Chapters,in: Financial Markets and Financial Crises, pages 175-206 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Burton Abrams & William Dougan, 1986. "The effects of constitutional restraints on governmental spending," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 101-116, January.
    4. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2013. "Dispersed communication by central bank committees and the predictability of monetary policy decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 223-244, October.
    5. J.B Crihfield & J.H. Wood, 1995. "Private goals and monetary policy: inflation and resignations from the Federal Reserve Board," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 48(195), pages 441-460.
    6. Tomas Otahal & Vaclav Rybacek, 2011. "Can Tight and Centralized Financial Regulation Prevent Financial Crises? Czech Government Bond Seignorage in the Historical Perspective," MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics 2011-14, Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    7. Gary Anderson & William Shughart & Robert Tollison, 1988. "A public choice theory of the great contraction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 3-23, October.
    8. Rob McGregor, 2007. "Federal Reserve transparency: The more things change, the more they stay the same?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 269-273, December.
    9. Gabillon, Emmanuelle & Martimort, David, 2004. "The benefits of central bank's political independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 353-378, April.
    10. Boyes, William J. & Mounts, WM. Jr. & Sowell, Clifford & Payne, James E., 1996. "All politics is local: The effect of fiscal and monetary constitutions on economic policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 657-678.
    11. Tchétché N'Guessan, 1991. "Un modèle de comportement bureaucratique de la Banque centrale. Le cas de la BCEAO," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(5), pages 901-916.
    12. Kim, Iljoong & Kim, Inbae, 2007. "Endogenous selection of monetary institutions: With the case of discount windows and bureaucratic discretion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 330-350, September.
    13. Eugenia Toma & Mark Toma, 1985. "Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 175-191, January.
    14. Yoshiharu Oritani, 2010. "Public governance of central banks: an approach from new institutional economics," BIS Working Papers 299, Bank for International Settlements.
    15. Mohammad Abdul Munim Joarder & A. K. M. Nurul Hossain & Monir Uddin Ahmed, 2016. "Does the central bank contribute to the political monetary cycles in Bangladesh?," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 49(4), pages 365-394, November.
    16. Green, Steven L. & Grossman, Herschel I., 1986. "The illusion of stabilization policy?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 221-235, January.
    17. Wm. Mounts & Clifford Sowell & James Lindley, 1985. "Rent-seeking over time: The continuity of capture," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 87-94, January.
    18. Thomas Havrilesky, 1990. "Distributive Conflict And Monetary Policy," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(2), pages 50-61, April.
    19. Herschel I. Grossman, 1988. "The Political Economy of War Debts and Inflation," NBER Working Papers 2743, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Caporale, Tony & Grier, Kevin B, 1998. "A Political Model of Monetary Policy with Application to the Real Fed Funds Rate," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 409-428, October.
    21. Michael D. Bordo, 1988. "The Contribution of a Monetary History of the United States: 1867 to 1960 To Monetary History," NBER Working Papers 2549, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Stuart Allen & Donald McCrickard & Phillip Cartwright & Charles Delorme, 1988. "The use of inputs by the Federal Reserve System: An extended model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 205-214, December.
    23. J.B Crihfield & J.H. Wood, 1995. "Private goals and monetary policy: inflation and resignations from the Federal Reserve Board," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 48(195), pages 441-460.

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