Are district presidents more conservative than board governors?
It is widely believed that the Federal Open Market Committee policy votes of Federal Reserve Bank presidents are more "conservative" than those of their Board governor counterparts. In both academia and Congress, the suspicion runs deep that the political appointment procedure exercised over Federal Reserve Board governors-nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate-results in monetary policy that is more concerned with output and less concerned with inflation than the policy produced by the more politically independent District Bank presidents. ; This article examines the data to determine whether it supports this conventional wisdom. The statistical techniques used in this paper permit a test of the hypothesis necessary to support their conclusions. The evidence rejects the conclusion that significant differences exist.
Volume (Year): (1991)
Issue (Month): Sep ()
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- Allen, Stuart D, 1986. "The Federal Reserve and the Electoral Cycle: A Note," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 18(1), pages 88-94, February.
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"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Havrilesky, Thomas, 1988. "Monetary Policy Signaling from the Administration to the Federal Reserve," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(1), pages 83-101, February.
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- Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-41, November.
- repec:bla:restud:v:47:y:1980:i:1:p:225-38 is not listed on IDEAS
- Havrilesky, Thomas M, 1987. "A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(3), pages 308-25, August.
- repec:tpr:qjecon:v:92:y:1978:i:3:p:525-34 is not listed on IDEAS
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