Dissent and Disagreement on the Fed's FOMC: Understanding Regional Affiliations and limits to Transparency
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
Keywordscentral banking; Federal Reserve; FOMC; voting;
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CBA-2006-04-22 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2006-04-22 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2006-04-22 (Monetary Economics)
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