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Dissent and Disagreement on the Fed's FOMC: Understanding Regional Affiliations and limits to Transparency

  • Ellen Meade

This paper addresses two important, but distinct, issues in monetary policy. The first issue concerns regional influences on voting within a monetary policy committee. In a committee that includes representatives from different regions or countries, is there a regional element to the monetary policy decision or to the votes cast by monetary policymakers? The second issue concerns possible limits to transparency. In an independent central bank that strives to be accountable and to communicate its policy effectively, are there circumstances under which increasing transparency could be harmful? The answer to both of these questions with respect to the Federal Reserve is "maybe".

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File URL: http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/Working%20Paper%2094_tcm46-146751.pdf
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Paper provided by Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department in its series DNB Working Papers with number 094.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:094
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Web page: http://www.dnb.nl/en/

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  1. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2005. "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 5155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Anne Sibert, 1999. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 226, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-41, November.
  4. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John A, 1992. " Reliable and Unreliable Partisan Appointees to the Board of Governors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 397-417, June.
  5. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  6. Gildea, John A, 1992. "The Regional Representation of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(2), pages 215-25, May.
  7. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Geraats, P., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," Other publications TiSEM b34dfb1f-520f-4787-a08f-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  8. Hahn, Volker & Gersbach, Hans, 2001. "Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers be Published?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,02, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  9. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1991. "Regional economic conditions and the FOMC votes of district presidents," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Mar, pages 3-16.
  10. Alan S. Blinder & Ricardo Reis, 2005. "Understanding the Greenspan standard," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 11-96.
  11. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
  12. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
  13. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John, 1995. "The Biases of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(2), pages 274-84, April.
  14. Ellen E. Meade & David Stasavage, 2004. "Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve," CEP Discussion Papers dp0608, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  15. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
  16. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, June.
  17. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2007. "Communication by Central Bank Committee Members: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(2-3), pages 509-541, 03.
  18. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665.
  19. Ellen E. Meade, 2005. "The FOMC: preferences, voting, and consensus," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 93-101.
  20. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1991. "Are district presidents more conservative than board governors?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 3-12.
  21. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  22. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2005. "Communication and decision-making by central bank committees: different strategies, same effectiveness?," Working Paper Series 0488, European Central Bank.
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