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Committee decision-making at Sweden's Riksbank

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  • Chappell, Henry W.
  • McGregor, Rob Roy

Abstract

Many central banks now publish transcripts or summaries of meeting discussions and record policy preferences of individual members of policymaking committees. We present an econometric model of committee decisions for Sweden's Riksbank that uses individual preference data pooled over committee members and meetings. Estimates indicate that members attach a small weight to their own preferences when voting; instead, members tend to defer to the perceived committee consensus. These results contrast with some previous findings that members deferred to the committee chairman when voting.

Suggested Citation

  • Chappell, Henry W. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 2018. "Committee decision-making at Sweden's Riksbank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 120-133.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:53:y:2018:i:c:p:120-133
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.07.005
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    C23 – Panel Data Models; E52 – Monetary Policy; E58 – Central Banks and Their Policies; Monetary policy; Central banking; Incidental parameters; Committee decisions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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