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The influence of FOMC member characteristics on the monetary policy decision-making process

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  • Smales, Lee A.
  • Apergis, Nick

Abstract

This paper provides new empirical evidence on a monetary policy committee with heterogeneous members whose decisions affect the efficacy of monetary policy. It thereby provides a link between the literature on monetary policy committees and central bank monetary policy implementation through monetary rules. Using a novel dataset of the idiosyncratic characteristics of FOMC members, over the period from August 1979 to February 2014, the empirical findings show that characteristics such as education, age, and, to a lesser extent, work experience are not important in understanding the FOMC decision-making process. Instead, the results point to the importance of time spent within the Federal Reserve System, tenure on the FOMC itself, and the influence of the Chair in shaping the decision-making process. The results are expected to have implications for the capacity of economic agents, as well as various markets in the economy, to more readily interpret public (monetary policy) information that reaches them. This makes the monetary policy decision process less noisy and thus enhances the capability of agents and markets to attach the correct weight to this information.

Suggested Citation

  • Smales, Lee A. & Apergis, Nick, 2016. "The influence of FOMC member characteristics on the monetary policy decision-making process," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 216-231.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:64:y:2016:i:c:p:216-231
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.12.002
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    Cited by:

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    2. Nicholas Apergis & Chritina Christou & Tasawar Hayat & Tareq Saeed, 2020. "U.S. Monetary Policy and Herding: Evidence from Commodity Markets," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 48(3), pages 355-374, September.
    3. Bennani, Hamza & Kranz, Tobias & Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2018. "Disagreement between FOMC members and the Fed’s staff: New insights based on a counterfactual interest rate," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 139-153.
    4. Hamza Bennani & Tobias Kranz & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2017. "Disagreement Between the FOMC and the Fed's Staff: New Insights Based on a Counterfactual Interest Rate," Research Papers in Economics 2017-10, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    5. Dodge Cahan & Luisa Doerr & Niklas Potrafke, 2019. "Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 215-238, December.
    6. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R & Uribe-McGuire, Alicia, 2021. "Allies or Commitment Devices? A Model of Appointments to the Federal Reserve," SocArXiv b5zts, Center for Open Science.
    7. Thomas L. Hogan, 2022. "The calculus of dissent: Bias and diversity in FOMC projections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 105-135, April.
    8. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    9. Eichler, Stefan & Lähner, Tom & Noth, Felix, 2018. "Regional banking instability and FOMC voting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 282-292.
    10. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    11. Caitlin Ainsley, 2022. "Federal reserve appointments and the politics of senate confirmation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 93-110, January.
    12. Smales, L.A. & Apergis, N., 2017. "Understanding the impact of monetary policy announcements: The importance of language and surprises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 33-50.
    13. Keith E. Schnakenberg & Ian R. Turner & Alicia Uribe-McGuire, 2017. "Allies or commitment devices? A model of appointments to the Federal Reserve," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 118-132, July.
    14. Davide Romelli & Hamza Bennani, 2021. "Disagreement inside the FOMC: New Insights from Tone Analysis," Trinity Economics Papers tep1021, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy committees; Characteristics of committee members; Monetary policy rules; FOMC;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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