IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/iwhdps/iwh-15-16.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Eichler, Stefan
  • Lähner, Tom
  • Noth, Felix

Abstract

This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts' regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period from 1978 to 2010, we find that a deterioration in a district's bank health increases the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Eichler, Stefan & Lähner, Tom & Noth, Felix, 2016. "Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting," IWH Discussion Papers 15/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:iwh-15-16
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/141305/1/859169065.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 2001. "Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 253-257, May.
    2. Hayo, Bernd & Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2013. "Do Federal Reserve presidents communicate with a regional bias?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 62-72.
    3. Teranishi, Yuki, 2012. "Credit spread and monetary policy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 26-28.
    4. Adam S. Posen, 2006. "Why Central Banks Should Not Burst Bubbles," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 109-124, May.
    5. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-441, November.
    6. Rebel Cole & Lawrence White, 2012. "Déjà Vu All Over Again: The Causes of U.S. Commercial Bank Failures This Time Around," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 42(1), pages 5-29, October.
    7. Stefan Eichler & Tom Lähner, 2014. "Forecast dispersion, dissenting votes, and monetary policy preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 429-453, September.
    8. El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2015. "Does the Greenspan era provide evidence on leadership in the FOMC?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 173-190.
    9. Laeven, Luc & Levine, Ross, 2009. "Bank governance, regulation and risk taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 259-275, August.
    10. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John A, 1992. "Reliable and Unreliable Partisan Appointees to the Board of Governors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 397-417, June.
    11. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-677, August.
    12. Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco, 2014. "Dissent in monetary policy decisions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 137-154.
    13. Mark Harris & Paul Levine & Christopher Spencer, 2011. "A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 413-442, March.
    14. Henry W. Chappell & Thomas M. Havrilesky & Rob Roy McGregor, 1993. "Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 185-218.
    15. Martin, Christopher & Milas, Costas, 2013. "Financial crises and monetary policy: Evidence from the UK," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 654-661.
    16. Gnabo, Jean-Yves & Moccero, Diego Nicolas, 2015. "Risk management, nonlinearity and aggressiveness in monetary policy: The case of the US Fed," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 281-294.
    17. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Lianfa Li, 2008. "Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Matter For Monetary Policy?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(4), pages 643-659, October.
    18. Baxa, Jaromír & Horváth, Roman & Vašíček, Bořek, 2013. "Time-varying monetary-policy rules and financial stress: Does financial instability matter for monetary policy?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 117-138.
    19. Vasco Curdia & Michael Woodford, 2010. "Credit Spreads and Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 3-35, September.
    20. Henry W. Chappell Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor, 2000. "A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 906-922, April.
    21. Cinzia Alcidi & Alessandro Flamini & Andrea Fracasso, 2011. "Policy Regime Changes, Judgment and Taylor rules in the Greenspan Era," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 78(309), pages 89-107, January.
    22. Vítor, Castro, 2011. "Can central banks' monetary policy be described by a linear (augmented) Taylor rule or by a nonlinear rule?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 228-246, December.
    23. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2009. "Monetary Policy Strategy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262513374, January.
    24. Keeley, Michael C, 1990. "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1183-1200, December.
    25. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1437-1467.
    26. Goodfriend, Marvin & McCallum, Bennett T., 2007. "Banking and interest rates in monetary policy analysis: A quantitative exploration," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(5), pages 1480-1507, July.
    27. Ellen E. Meade, 2010. "Federal Reserve Transcript Publication And Regional Representation," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(2), pages 162-170, April.
    28. David C. Wheelock & Paul W. Wilson, 2000. "Why do Banks Disappear? The Determinants of U.S. Bank Failures and Acquisitions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 127-138, February.
    29. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John, 1995. "The Biases of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(2), pages 274-284, April.
    30. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John A, 1991. "The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(1), pages 130-138, February.
    31. Stefan Eichler & Tom Lähner, 2014. "Regional House Price Dynamics And Voting Behavior In The Fomc," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(2), pages 625-645, April.
    32. Gildea, John A, 1992. "The Regional Representation of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(2), pages 215-225, May.
    33. Michael Woodford, 2010. "Financial Intermediation and Macroeconomic Analysis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(4), pages 21-44, Fall.
    34. Henry W. Chappell, Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, 2005. "Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033305, January.
    35. Eichler, Stefan & Hielscher, Kai, 2012. "Does the ECB act as a lender of last resort during the subprime lending crisis?: Evidence from monetary policy reaction models," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 552-568.
    36. Henry Chappell & Rob McGregor & Todd Vermilyea, 2007. "The persuasive power of a Committee Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 103-112, July.
    37. Michael Woodford, 2012. "Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability," NBER Working Papers 17967, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    38. Philip Lowe & Claudio Borio, 2002. "Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus," BIS Working Papers 114, Bank for International Settlements.
    39. Chappell, Henry Jr. & Havrilesky, Thomas M. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1995. "Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 113-136, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    FOMC voting; regional banking sector instability; lobbying;

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:iwhdps:iwh-15-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/iwhhhde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.