Is There a Limit on FOMC Dissents? Evidence from the Greenspan Era
Dissents in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are relatively rare. Is this because policymakers late in the voting order are deterred from dissenting? Dissents became infrequent during Chairman Greenspan's tenure, arguably rejecting his growing influence. We show that policymaker dissents also were driven by the alphabetical voting order in the FOMC, the number of dissents already cast, whether the policymaker in question is a Board member, and inlation. Because dissents help forecast future changes in the Federal funds rate, this implicit constraint on dissents may be ineffcient in that it prevents the communication of useful information to financial markets.
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