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Is the U.S. Fed Voting Record Informative about Future Monetary Policy?

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Abstract

We examine the information content of U.S. Fed voting records under the Greenspan chairmanship. We find that the voting records of FOMC members, as captured by the difference between the average voted-for and actually implemented policy rate, signal the future course of monetary policy. The committee bias, an official statement on how the Fed is leaning in terms of its next interest rate move, is found to improve monetary policy predictability, too. On the other hand, the voting of alternate members, who actively contribute to the discussions at the monetary policy meetings but whose votes do not count for setting the interest rate, does not have predictive power and is more in line with that of the chairman.

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  • Roman Horvath & Katerina Smidkova & Jan Zapal, 2012. "Is the U.S. Fed Voting Record Informative about Future Monetary Policy?," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 62(6), pages 478-484, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:62:y:2012:i:6:p:478-484
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    2. Robert Ambrisko & Vitezslav Augusta & Jan Babecky & Michal Franta & Dana Hajkova & Petr Kral & Jan Libich & Pavla Netusilova & Milan Rikovsky & Jakub Rysanek & Pavel Soukup & Petr Stehlik & Vilem Vale, 2013. "Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Policy," Occasional Publications - Edited Volumes, Czech National Bank, edition 2, volume 11, number rb11/2 edited by Jan Babecky & Kamil Galuscak, January.
    3. Kamil Galuscak & Adam Gersl & Marcela Gronychova & Petr Hlavac & Petr Jakubik & Lubos Komarek & Zlatuse Komarkova & Tomas Konecny & Jakub Seidler, 2014. "Stress-Testing Analyses of the Czech Financial System," Occasional Publications - Edited Volumes, Czech National Bank, edition 1, volume 12, number rb12/1 edited by Jan Babecky & Roman Horvath, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    monetary policy; voting record; transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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