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Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions

  • RIBONI, Alessandro
  • RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J.

Voting records indicate that dissents in monetary policy committees are frequent and predictability regressions show that they help forecast future policy decisions. In order to study whether the latter relation is causal, we construct a model of committee decision making and dissent where members' decisions are not a function of past dissents. The model is estimated using voting data from the Bank of England and the Riksbank. Stochastic simulations show that the decision-making frictions in our model help account for the predictive power of current dissents. The e ect of institutional characteristics and structural parameters on dissent rates is examined using simulations as well.

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Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 06-2011.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:06-2011
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