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Influence of Regional Cycles and Personal Background on FOMC Members' Preferences and Disagreement

Author

Listed:
  • Etienne Farvaque

    ()

  • Hamza Bennani

    () (EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Piotr Stanek

Abstract

This paper sheds some new light on the determinants of FOMC members? monetary policy preferences. For that purpose, we use a new dataset of macroeconomic indicators for the Fed districts, as well as preferences revealed by FOMC members in the Transcripts, to compute a desired interest rate for each individual member. First, we find that FOMC members react to the regional unemployment rate. Second, individuals holding a Master or Bachelor degree, and issued from either the central bank, or from the private or public sector have a higher propensity to disagree on the dovish side, while women tend to disagree on the hawkish side. These findings provide further insights for central bank watchers about the upcoming policy decisions that are likely to be implemented by the FOMC, following the composition of its committee and the evolution of regional cycles.

Suggested Citation

  • Etienne Farvaque & Hamza Bennani & Piotr Stanek, 2018. "Influence of Regional Cycles and Personal Background on FOMC Members' Preferences and Disagreement," Post-Print hal-01589198, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01589198
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01589198
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    1. repec:eee:jmacro:v:58:y:2018:i:c:p:139-153 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Bennani, Hamza & Kranz, Tobias & Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2018. "Disagreement between FOMC members and the Fed’s staff: New insights based on a counterfactual interest rate," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 139-153.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration

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