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Inter-agency coordination bodies and the speed of prudential policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic

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  • Michael Brei
  • Blaise Gadanecz

Abstract

This paper investigates whether the presence of inter-agency coordination bodies for financial stability (IABs) has been associated with faster prudential policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. Using econometric analysis, we provide evidence that countries with IABs have enacted microprudential measures more quickly than countries without. This is not the case for macroprudential measures for which we find that IABs have been associated with slower responses. We conclude that IABs may have been useful as catalysts for the deployment of microprudential tools for macroprudential purposes.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Brei & Blaise Gadanecz, 2021. "Inter-agency coordination bodies and the speed of prudential policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic," BIS Working Papers 969, Bank for International Settlements.
    • Handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:969
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank governance; inter-agency coordination body; financial stability council; microprudential policy; macroprudential policy; Covid-19; survival analysis.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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