Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
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- Ruben Enikolopov, 2011. "Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," Working Papers w0165, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Enikolopov, Ruben, 2018. "Are Bureaucrats Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," CEPR Discussion Papers 13051, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Cited by:
- Karachiwalla, Naureen & Park, Albert, 2017.
"Promotion incentives in the public sector: Evidence from Chinese schools,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 109-128.
- Albert Park & Naureen Karachiwalla, 2015. "Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools," HKUST IEMS Working Paper Series 2015-09, HKUST Institute for Emerging Market Studies, revised Feb 2015.
- Park, Albert & Karachiwalla, Naureen, 2016. "Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools," CEPR Discussion Papers 11704, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Karachiwalla, Naureen & Park, Albert, 2017. "Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools," IZA Discussion Papers 10547, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Albert Park & Naureen Karachiwalla, 2017. "Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools," Working Papers id:11648, eSocialSciences.
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JEL classification:
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
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