Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India
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- Iyer, Lakshmi; Mani, Anandi, 2010. "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 24, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Lakshmi Iyer & Anandi Mani, 2008. "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India," Working Papers id:1781, eSocialSciences.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Enikolopov, Ruben, 2014. "Politicians, bureaucrats and targeted redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 74-83.
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"Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India,"
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More about this item
Keywordscareer concerns; bureaucracy; bureaucrat reassignment;
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
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