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Candidate quality

  • Panu Poutvaara

    ()

  • Tuomas Takalo

    ()

We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the set of citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with ability differences, informative campaigning and political parties. Our results suggest that primaries, campaign costs and rewards have previously overlooked interactions that should be studied in a unified framework. Surprisingly, increasing the reward may lower the average candidate quality when the campaigning costs are sufficiently high. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10797-006-6691-2
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Article provided by Springer & International Institute of Public Finance in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 14 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 7-27

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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:14:y:2007:i:1:p:7-27
DOI: 10.1007/s10797-006-6691-2
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  1. Hans Gersbach, 2009. "Competition of politicians for wages and office," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(4), pages 533-553, May.
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  8. Poutvaara, Panu & Takalo, Tuomas, 2007. "Candidate quality," Munich Reprints in Economics 19785, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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  16. Christian Schultz, 2003. "Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series 858, CESifo Group Munich.
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  18. Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
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