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Candidate Quality

Author

Listed:
  • Poutvaara, Panu

    () (University of Munich)

  • Takalo, Tuomas

    () (Bank of Finland)

Abstract

We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the set of citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with ability differences, informative campaigning and political parties. Our results suggest that primaries, campaign costs and rewards have previously overlooked interactions that should be studied in a unified framework. Surprisingly, increasing the reward may lower the average candidate quality when the campaigning costs are sufficiently high.

Suggested Citation

  • Poutvaara, Panu & Takalo, Tuomas, 2004. "Candidate Quality," IZA Discussion Papers 1195, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1195
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    politicians' competence; career concerns; campaigning costs; rewards for elected officials; citizen-candidate models;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets

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