IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/bubdps/392017.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Appropriate monetary policy and forecast disagreement at the FOMC

Author

Listed:
  • Schultefrankenfeld, Guido

Abstract

I assess how dissenting views on appropriate monetary policy result in disagreement about the macroeconomic outlook of Federal Open Market Committee members. FOMC members that voted for a higher Fed Funds Rate than the majority of voters also forecast higher inflation rates, while they forecast lower unemployment rates relative to the consensus view on the future economy. Voters that tighten their stance revise inflation forecasts to the upside and unemployment forecasts to the downside. Members that switched their voting status between forecasting rounds, i.e., switched from voting with the majority to being a dissenting minority voter, or switched vice versa, are significantly more hesitant in revising their macroeconomic forecasts.

Suggested Citation

  • Schultefrankenfeld, Guido, 2017. "Appropriate monetary policy and forecast disagreement at the FOMC," Discussion Papers 39/2017, Deutsche Bundesbank.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:392017
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/172533/1/1009902318.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2012. "What Can Survey Forecasts Tell Us about Information Rigidities?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(1), pages 116-159.
    2. Richard Clarida & Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, 2000. "Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(1), pages 147-180.
    3. David Romer, 2010. "A New Data Set on Monetary Policy: The Economic Forecasts of Individual Members of the FOMC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(5), pages 951-957, August.
    4. Blinder, Alan S., 2007. "Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 106-123, March.
    5. Martin Ellison & Thomas J. Sargent, 2012. "A Defense Of The Fomc," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1047-1065, November.
    6. Belden, Susan, 1989. "Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 432-441, November.
    7. N. Gregory Mankiw & Ricardo Reis & Justin Wolfers, 2004. "Disagreement about Inflation Expectations," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, Volume 18, pages 209-270 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Stefan Eichler & Tom Lähner, 2014. "Forecast dispersion, dissenting votes, and monetary policy preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 429-453, September.
    9. Gianna Boero & Jeremy Smith & KennethF. Wallis, 2008. "Uncertainty and Disagreement in Economic Prediction: The Bank of England Survey of External Forecasters," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(530), pages 1107-1127, July.
    10. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-677, August.
    11. Fendel, Ralf & Rülke, Jan-Christoph, 2012. "Are heterogeneous FOMC forecasts consistent with the Fed’s monetary policy?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 5-7.
    12. Henry W. Chappell & Thomas M. Havrilesky & Rob Roy McGregor, 1993. "Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 185-218.
    13. Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Tillmann, Peter, 2011. "Do FOMC members herd?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 176-179.
      • Jan-Christoph Rülke & Peter Tillmann, 2010. "Do FOMC Members Herd?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201032, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    14. Henry W. Chappell Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor, 2000. "A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 906-922, April.
    15. Tillmann, Peter, 2011. "Strategic forecasting on the FOMC," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 547-553, September.
    16. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael & Velasco Rivera, Carlos, 2014. "Preferences or private assessments on a monetary policy committee?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 16-32.
    17. Petra Gerlach-Kristen & Ellen E. Meade, 2010. "Is There a Limit on FOMC Dissents? Evidence from the Greenspan Era," Working Papers 2010-16, American University, Department of Economics.
    18. Timothy Besley & Neil Meads & Paolo Surico, 2008. "Insiders versus Outsiders in Monetary Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 218-223, May.
    19. Dopke, Jorg & Fritsche, Ulrich, 2006. "When do forecasters disagree? An assessment of German growth and inflation forecast dispersion," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 125-135.
    20. Michael P. Clements, 2015. "Do US Macroeconomic Forecasters Exaggerate their Differences?," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(8), pages 649-660, December.
    21. repec:spr:empeco:v:53:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00181-016-1182-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Bernhardt, Dan & Campello, Murillo & Kutsoati, Edward, 2006. "Who herds?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 657-675, June.
    23. Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John A, 1991. "The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(1), pages 130-138, February.
    24. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2009. "Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(6), pages 1099-1115, September.
    25. Chappell, Henry W, Jr & McGregor, Rob Roy & Vermilyea, Todd, 2004. "Majority Rule, Consensus Building, and the Power of the Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 407-422, June.
    26. Carlos Capistrán & Manuel Ramos-Francia, 2010. "Does Inflation Targeting Affect the Dispersion of Inflation Expectations?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(1), pages 113-134, February.
    27. William A. Branch, 2014. "Nowcasting and the Taylor Rule," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(5), pages 1035-1055, August.
    28. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2004. "Is the MPC's Voting Record Informative about Future UK Monetary Policy?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(2), pages 299-313, June.
    29. Ellis, Michael A. & Liu, Dandan, 2016. "FOMC forecasts and monetary policy deliberations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 131-134.
    30. Ellen E. Meade, 2005. "The FOMC: preferences, voting, and consensus," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 93-101.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federal Reserve System; Federal Open Market Committee; Federal Funds Rate; Dissent; Forecast Disagreement;

    JEL classification:

    • C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:bubdps:392017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dbbgvde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.