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Do FOMC members herd?

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  • Rülke, Jan-Christoph
  • Tillmann, Peter

Abstract

We show that growth and unemployment forecasts submitted by individual FOMC members do not exhibit herding behavior, while the inflation forecasts show strong evidence of anti-herding. Interestingly, anti-herding is more important for non-voting members than for voters.

Suggested Citation

  • Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Tillmann, Peter, 2011. "Do FOMC members herd?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 176-179.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:2:p:176-179
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.07.016
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    1. David Romer, 2010. "A New Data Set on Monetary Policy: The Economic Forecasts of Individual Members of the FOMC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(5), pages 951-957, August.
    2. Gavin, William T. & Mandal, Rachel J., 2003. "Evaluating FOMC forecasts," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 655-667.
    3. Athanasios Orphanides & Volker W. Wieland, 2008. "Economic projections and rules of thumb for monetary policy," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 90(Jul), pages 307-324.
    4. William T. Gavin, 2003. "FOMC forecast: is all the information in the central tendency?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 85(May), pages 27-46.
    5. Tillmann, Peter, 2011. "Strategic forecasting on the FOMC," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 547-553, September.
    6. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 2008. "The FOMC versus the Staff: Where Can Monetary Policymakers Add Value?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 230-235, May.
    7. Bernhardt, Dan & Campello, Murillo & Kutsoati, Edward, 2006. "Who herds?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 657-675, June.
    8. William T. Gavin & Geetanjali Pande, 2008. "FOMC consensus forecasts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 90(May), pages 149-164.
    9. Michael W. McCracken, 2010. "Using FOMC forecasts to forecast the economy," Economic Synopses, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    10. Chanont Banternghansa & Michael W. McCracken, 2009. "Forecast disagreement among FOMC members," Working Papers 2009-059, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Uncertainty and voting in monetary policy committees
      by BankUnderground in Bank Underground on 2021-03-02 09:00:00

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2015. "Does the Greenspan era provide evidence on leadership in the FOMC?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 173-190.
    2. Bernd Hayo & Ummad Mazhar, 2014. "Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement, Determinants, and Economic Effects," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 739-770, September.
    3. Bohl, Martin T. & Klein, Arne C. & Siklos, Pierre L., 2014. "Short-selling bans and institutional investors' herding behaviour: Evidence from the global financial crisis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 262-269.
    4. Guido Schultefrankenfeld, 2020. "Appropriate monetary policy and forecast disagreement at the FOMC," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 223-255, January.
    5. Jaime Marquez, 2023. "Stylized Facts of the FOMC’s Longer-Run Forecasts," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 16(3), pages 1-20, February.
    6. Hamza Bennani, 2016. "Measuring Monetary Policy Stress for Fed District Representatives," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 63(2), pages 156-176, May.
    7. Ellis, Michael A. & Liu, Dandan, 2016. "FOMC forecasts and monetary policy deliberations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 131-134.
    8. Jaime Marquez & S Yanki Kalfa, 2021. "The Forecasts of Individual FOMC Members: New Evidence after Ten Years," Working Papers 2021-003, The George Washington University, Department of Economics, H. O. Stekler Research Program on Forecasting.
    9. Peter Tillmann, 2011. "Reputation and Forecast Revisions: Evidence from the FOMC," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201128, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    10. Christian Pierdzioch & Jan-Christoph Rülke & Peter Tillmann, 2013. "Using forecasts to uncover the loss function of FOMC members," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201302, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    11. Fendel, Ralf & Rülke, Jan-Christoph, 2012. "Are heterogeneous FOMC forecasts consistent with the Fed’s monetary policy?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 5-7.
    12. Goldstein, Nathan & Zilberfarb, Ben-Zion, 2021. "Do forecasters really care about consensus?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    13. Schanne, Norbert, 2012. "The formation of experts' expectations on labour markets : do they run with the pack?," IAB-Discussion Paper 201225, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    14. Nakazono, Yoshiyuki, 2013. "Strategic behavior of Federal Open Market Committee board members: Evidence from members’ forecasts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 62-70.
    15. Smales, Lee A. & Apergis, Nick, 2016. "The influence of FOMC member characteristics on the monetary policy decision-making process," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 216-231.
    16. Nicholas Apergis & Ioannis Pragidis, 2019. "Stock Price Reactions to Wire News from the European Central Bank: Evidence from Changes in the Sentiment Tone and International Market Indexes," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(1), pages 91-112, February.
    17. Rülke Jan-Christoph, 2012. "Do Private Sector Forecasters Desire to Deviate From the German Council of Economic Experts?," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 232(4), pages 414-428, August.
    18. Jan-Christoph Rülke, 2011. "Do private sector forecasters desire to deviate from the German council of economic experts?," WHU Working Paper Series - Economics Group 11-04, WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management.
    19. Roman Horvath & Katerina Smidkova & Jan Zapal, 2012. "Is the U.S. Fed Voting Record Informative about Future Monetary Policy?," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 62(6), pages 478-484, December.
    20. Firrell, Alastair & Reinold, Kate, 2020. "Uncertainty and voting on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee," Bank of England working papers 898, Bank of England.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federal Open Market Committee; Monetary policy; Forecasting; Herding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E27 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications

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