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Reputation and Forecast Revisions: Evidence from the FOMC

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  • Peter Tillmann

    () (University of Giessen)

Abstract

This paper investigates how FOMC members revise their forecasts for key macroeconomic variables. Based on a new data set of forecasts from individual FOMC members between 1992 and 2000 it is shown that FOMC members intentionally overrevise their forecasts at the first revision and underrevise at the final revision date. This pattern of rationally biased forecasts is similar to that of private sector forecasters and is consistent with theories of reputation building among forecasters. The FOMC’s shift towards more transparency in 1994 had an impact on how members revised their forecasts and intensified the tendency to underrevise at the later stage of the forecasting process. The tendency to underrevise, i.e. to smooth forecast revisions, is particularly strong for nonvoting members of the committee.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Tillmann, 2011. "Reputation and Forecast Revisions: Evidence from the FOMC," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201128, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  • Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201128
    as

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    File URL: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/28-2011_tillmann.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2011
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Messina, Jeffrey D. & Sinclair, Tara M. & Stekler, Herman, 2015. "What can we learn from revisions to the Greenbook forecasts?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 54-62.
    2. Deschamps, Bruno & Ioannidis, Christos, 2013. "Can rational stubbornness explain forecast biases?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 141-151.
    3. Sheng, Xuguang (Simon), 2015. "Evaluating the economic forecasts of FOMC members," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 165-175.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    biased forecasts; reputation; forecast errors; monetary policy; transparency; Federal Reserve;

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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