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The Influence and Policy Signalling Role of FOMC Forecasts

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  • Paul Hubert

Abstract

type="main" xml:id="obes12093-abs-0001"> Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) policymakers have published macroeconomic forecasts since 1979 and we examine the effects of FOMC inflation forecasts using a structural VAR model. First, we assess whether they influence private inflation expectations. Second, we investigate the underlying mechanism at work and whether they convey policy signals. We provide original evidence that FOMC inflation forecasts influence private ones. We also find that the influencing effect of FOMC forecasts does not come through current Fed rate changes, that FOMC forecasts affect private expectations in a different way than current policy decisions, and that FOMC forecasts are informative about future Fed rate movements.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Hubert, 2015. "The Influence and Policy Signalling Role of FOMC Forecasts," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 77(5), pages 655-680, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:obuest:v:77:y:2015:i:5:p:655-680
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    2. Cole, Stephen J. & Martínez-García, Enrique, 2023. "The effect of central bank credibility on forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(2), pages 532-570, March.
    3. Łyziak, Tomasz & Paloviita, Maritta, 2018. "On the formation of inflation expectations in turbulent times: The case of the euro area," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 132-139.
    4. Trabelsi, Emna, 2016. "Central bank transparency and the consensus forecast: What does The Economist poll of forecasters tell us?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 338-359.
    5. Criste Adina & Lupu Iulia, 2017. "Communication Tool in Central Banking. Increasing its Role for the New Reality," Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, Ovidius University of Constantza, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 0(2), pages 537-541, December.
    6. Tomasz Łyziak & Maritta Paloviita, 2017. "Formation of inflation expectations in turbulent times. Recent evidence from the European Survey of Professional Forecasters," NBP Working Papers 261, Narodowy Bank Polski.
    7. Goy, Gavin & Hommes, Cars & Mavromatis, Kostas, 2022. "Forward guidance and the role of central bank credibility under heterogeneous beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 1240-1274.
    8. Vereda, Luciano & Savignon, João & Gouveia da Silva, Tarciso, 2024. "A theory-based method to evaluate the impact of central bank inflation forecasts on private inflation expectations," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 1069-1084.
    9. Łyziak, Tomasz & Paloviita, Maritta, 2017. "Formation of inflation expectations in turbulent times: Can ECB manage inflation expectations of professional forecasters?," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 13/2017, Bank of Finland.
    10. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2017_013 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Łyziak, Tomasz & Paloviita, Maritta, 2017. "Formation of inflation expectations in turbulent times : Can ECB manage inflation expectations of professional forecasters?," Research Discussion Papers 13/2017, Bank of Finland.
    12. Tura-Gawron, Karolina, 2019. "Consumers’ approach to the credibility of the inflation forecasts published by central banks: A new methodological solution," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    13. Charemza, Wojciech & Díaz, Carlos & Makarova, Svetlana, 2019. "Quasi ex-ante inflation forecast uncertainty," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 994-1007.
    14. Gavin Goy & Cars Homme & Kostas Mavromatis, 2018. "Forward Guidance and the Role of Central Bank Credibility," DNB Working Papers 614, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.

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    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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