IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/feddgw/86685.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Effect of Central Bank Credibility on Forward Guidance in an Estimated New Keynesian Model

Author

Listed:
  • Stephen J. Cole
  • Enrique Martinez-Garcia

Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility. We estimate credibility for the U.S. Federal Reserve with Bayesian methods exploiting survey data on interest rate expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The results provide important takeaways: (1) The estimate of Federal Reserve credibility in terms of forward guidance announcements is relatively high, which indicates muted forward guidance effectiveness relative to the fully credible case. Hence, anticipation effects are attenuated and, accordingly, output and inflation do not respond as favorably to forward guidance announcements. (2) The so-called “forward guidance puzzle” is shown to arise, at least in part, from the unrealistically large responses of macroeconomic variables to forward guidance statements in structural models that do not incorporate imperfect credibility and heterogeneous expectations. (3) Imperfect monetary authority credibility provides a plausible explanation to the evidence of forecasting error predictability based on forecasting disagreement found in the SPF data. Thus, accounting for imperfect credibility is important to model the formation of expectations in the economy and to understand the transmission mechanism of forward guidance announcements.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen J. Cole & Enrique Martinez-Garcia, 2019. "The Effect of Central Bank Credibility on Forward Guidance in an Estimated New Keynesian Model," Globalization Institute Working Papers 375, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, revised 20 Mar 2021.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:feddgw:86685
    DOI: 10.24149/gwp375r2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/institute/wpapers/2019/0375r2.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Hubert, 2015. "Do Central Bank Forecasts Influence Private Agents? Forecasting Performance versus Signals," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(4), pages 771-789, June.
    2. Campbell, Jeffrey R. & Ferroni, Filippo & Fisher, Jonas D.M. & Melosi, Leonardo, 2019. "The limits of forward guidance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 118-134.
    3. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2012. "What Can Survey Forecasts Tell Us about Information Rigidities?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(1), pages 116-159.
    4. Honkapohja, Seppo & Mitra, Kaushik, 2005. "Performance of inflation targeting based on constant interest rate projections," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1867-1892, November.
    5. Andrade, Philippe & Le Bihan, Hervé, 2013. "Inattentive professional forecasters," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(8), pages 967-982.
    6. Stefan Laséen & Lars E.O. Svensson, 2011. "Anticipated Alternative policy Rate Paths in Plicy Simulations," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 7(3), pages 1-35, September.
    7. Michael Kiley, 2016. "Policy Paradoxes in the New-Keynesian Model," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 21, pages 1-15, July.
    8. Orphanides, Athanasios & Williams, John C., 2007. "Robust monetary policy with imperfect knowledge," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(5), pages 1406-1435, July.
    9. Vitor Gaspar & Frank Smets & David Vestin, 2006. "Adaptive Learning, Persistence, and Optimal Monetary Policy," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(2-3), pages 376-385, 04-05.
    10. Taisuke Nakata & Takeki Sunakawa, 2019. "Credible Forward Guidance," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-037, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Carlstrom, Charles T. & Fuerst, Timothy S. & Paustian, Matthias, 2015. "Inflation and output in New Keynesian models with a transient interest rate peg," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 230-243.
    12. Hansen, Lars Peter & Sargent, Thomas J., 1980. "Formulating and estimating dynamic linear rational expectations models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 7-46, May.
    13. Stephen J. Cole, 2021. "Learning and the Effectiveness of Central Bank Forward Guidance," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 157-200, February.
    14. Joscha Beckmann & Robert L. Czudaj, 2018. "Monetary Policy Shocks, Expectations, And Information Rigidities," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2158-2176, October.
    15. Branch, William A. & McGough, Bruce, 2009. "A New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 1036-1051, May.
    16. Stefano Eusepi & Bruce Preston, 2010. "Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 235-271, July.
    17. Stephen J. Cole, 2020. "The Limits of Central Bank forward Guidance under Learning," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(4), pages 199-250, September.
    18. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2015. "Information Rigidity and the Expectations Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2644-2678, August.
    19. Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum & Charles L. Evans, 2005. "Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 1-45, February.
    20. Haberis, Alex & Harrison, Richard & Waldron, Matt, 2014. "Transitory interest-rate pegs under imperfect credibility," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 86335, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    21. Eric T. Swanson, 2018. "The Federal Reserve Is Not Very Constrained by the Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 49(2 (Fall)), pages 555-572.
    22. Alisdair McKay & Emi Nakamura & Jón Steinsson, 2016. "The Power of Forward Guidance Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(10), pages 3133-3158, October.
    23. Philippe Andrade & Gaetano Gaballo & Eric Mengus & Benoît Mojon, 2019. "Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 1-29, July.
    24. Kwangyong Park, 2018. "Central Bank Credibility and Monetary Policy," Working Papers 2018-45, Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea.
    25. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    26. John C. Williams, 2013. "Will unconventional monetary policy be the new normal?," Speech 123, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    27. Mark A. Wynne, 2013. "A short history of FOMC communication," Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, vol. 8(sep).
    28. Calvo, Guillermo A., 1983. "Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 383-398, September.
    29. Cole, Stephen J. & Milani, Fabio, 2019. "The Misspecification Of Expectations In New Keynesian Models: A Dsge-Var Approach," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 974-1007, April.
    30. Frank Smets & Rafael Wouters, 2007. "Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 586-606, June.
    31. Gavin Goy & Cars Homme & Kostas Mavromatis, 2018. "Forward Guidance and the Role of Central Bank Credibility," DNB Working Papers 614, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    32. Paul Hubert, 2015. "The Influence and Policy Signalling Role of FOMC Forecasts," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 77(5), pages 655-680, October.
    33. Milani, Fabio, 2007. "Expectations, learning and macroeconomic persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 2065-2082, October.
    34. Silvio Contessi & Li Li, 2013. "Forward guidance 101A: a roadmap of the U.S. experience," Economic Synopses, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    35. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, February.
    36. John C. Williams, 2013. "Will unconventional policy be the new normal?," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue oct7.
    37. Paul Hubert, 2014. "FOMC Forecasts as a Focal Point for Private Expectations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(7), pages 1381-1420, October.
    38. repec:fip:fedfsp:y:2013:i:oct3 is not listed on IDEAS
    39. Yun, Tack, 1996. "Nominal price rigidity, money supply endogeneity, and business cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 345-370, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cole, Stephen J., 2020. "The influence of learning and price-level targeting on central bank forward guidance," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    2. Enrique Martinez-Garcia, 2020. "Get the Lowdown: The International Side of the Fall in the U.S. Natural Rate of Interest," Globalization Institute Working Papers 403, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, revised 20 Feb 2021.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cole, Stephen J., 2020. "The influence of learning and price-level targeting on central bank forward guidance," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    2. Gavin Goy & Cars Homme & Kostas Mavromatis, 2018. "Forward Guidance and the Role of Central Bank Credibility," DNB Working Papers 614, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    3. Stephen J. Cole, 2020. "The Limits of Central Bank forward Guidance under Learning," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(4), pages 199-250, September.
    4. Benjamin D. Keen & Alexander W. Richter & Nathaniel A. Throckmorton, 2017. "Forward Guidance And The State Of The Economy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1593-1624, October.
    5. Florin O. Bilbiie, 2019. "Optimal Forward Guidance," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 310-345, October.
    6. Stephen J. Cole, 2021. "Learning and the Effectiveness of Central Bank Forward Guidance," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(1), pages 157-200, February.
    7. Cole, Stephen J., 2018. "The effectiveness of central bank forward guidance under inflation and price-level targeting," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 146-161.
    8. Beqiraj, Elton & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Di Pietro, Marco, 2019. "Beliefs formation and the puzzle of forward guidance power," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 20-32.
    9. Philippe Andrade & Gaetano Gaballo & Eric Mengus & Benoît Mojon, 2019. "Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 1-29, July.
    10. Campbell, Jeffrey R. & Ferroni, Filippo & Fisher, Jonas D.M. & Melosi, Leonardo, 2019. "The limits of forward guidance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 118-134.
    11. Richhild Moessner & David-Jan Jansen & Jakob de Haan, 2017. "Communication About Future Policy Rates In Theory And Practice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 678-711, July.
    12. Jeffrey R. Campbell & Jonas D. M. Fisher & Alejandro Justiniano & Leonardo Melosi, 2017. "Forward Guidance and Macroeconomic Outcomes since the Financial Crisis," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 283-357.
    13. Lawrence J. Christiano & Martin S. Eichenbaum & Mathias Trabandt, 2018. "On DSGE Models," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 113-140, Summer.
    14. Harrison, Richard, 2015. "Estimating the effects of forward guidance in rational expectations models," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 196-213.
    15. Haberis, Alex & Harrison, Richard & Waldron, Matt, 2019. "Uncertain policy promises," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 459-474.
    16. Muto, Ichiro, 2013. "Productivity growth, transparency, and monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 329-344.
    17. Beqiraj Elton & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Serpieri Carolina, 2017. "Bounded-rationality and heterogeneous agents: Long or short forecasters?," wp.comunite 00132, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    18. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2018. "Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(9), pages 2477-2512, September.
    19. Nakata, Taisuke & Ogaki, Ryota & Schmidt, Sebastian & Yoo, Paul, 2019. "Attenuating the forward guidance puzzle: Implications for optimal monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 90-106.
    20. Lindé, Jesper & Smets, Frank & Wouters, Rafael, 2016. "Challenges for Central Banks´ Macro Models," Working Paper Series 323, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Forward Guidance; Monetary Policy; Expectations; Central Bank Credibility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • E30 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:feddgw:86685. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbdaus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbdaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.