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Central Bank Credibility and Monetary Policy

Author

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  • Kwangyong Park

    (Economic Research Institute, The Bank of Korea)

Abstract

A numerical measure of central bank credibility, which can be incorporated into a New Keynesian model under bounded rationality, is proposed and analyzed. This measure arises mainly due to the existence of the drifts in private long-term predictions, which are different from those of the central bank. It is shown that central bank credibility matters for macroeconomic stability. As the credibility increases, macroeconomic variables vary less. This generates endogenous volatility changes. Lastly, the magnitude of response of inflation to monetary policy depends on the level of credibility. This suggests that ignoring credibility changes might leads to overestimate of the cost of disinflation.

Suggested Citation

  • Kwangyong Park, 2018. "Central Bank Credibility and Monetary Policy," Working Papers 2018-45, Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea.
    • Handle: RePEc:bok:wpaper:1845
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Ehrmann, 2026. "Trust in Central Banks," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 492-504, February.
    2. Park, Kwangyong, 2022. "The excess sensitivity of long-term interest rates and central bank credibility," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    3. Linta, Tanja, 2024. "Forward Guidance and Credibility," TSE Working Papers 24-1532, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. Svec, Justin & Tortorice, Daniel L., 2025. "Asserting independence: Optimal monetary policy when the central bank and political authority disagree," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    5. Ehrmann, Michael & Georgarakos, Dimitris & Kenny, Geoff, 2025. "Credibility gains from central bank communication with the public," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    6. Choi, Sangyup & Furceri, Davide & Loungani, Prakash & Shim, Myungkyu, 2022. "Inflation anchoring and growth: The role of credit constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    7. Baranyai, Eszter & Kolozsi, Pál Péter & Neszveda, Gábor & Lehmann, Kristóf & Banai, Ádám, 2025. "The impact of the green direction in central banking on the general public's trust: Evidence from Hungary," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    8. Anderson Grajales-Olarte & Franz Hamann & Sara Naranjo-Saldarriaga & José Pulido, 2025. "Policy implications of losing credibility: Lessons from Colombia’s post-pandemic inflationary surge," Borradores de Economia 1304, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    9. Cole, Stephen J., 2020. "The influence of learning and price-level targeting on central bank forward guidance," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    10. Anuradha Patnaik, 2025. "Are inflation expectations anchored in India? A peek through the credibility lens," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 1-23, February.
    11. Cole, Stephen J. & Martínez-García, Enrique, 2023. "The effect of central bank credibility on forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(2), pages 532-570, March.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E3 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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