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Opportunistic and deliberate disinflation under imperfect credibility

  • Antulio N. Bomfim
  • Glenn D. Rudebusch

One strategy for disinflation prescribes a deliberate path towards low inflation. A contrasting opportunistic approach eschews deliberate action and instead waits for unforeseen shocks to reduce inflation. This paper compares the ability of these two approaches to achieve disinflation---and at what cost. We analyze these issues using the Federal Reserve's FRB/US model, which allows alternative assumptions to be made about expectations held by agents in the economy; hence, the credibility of the central bank can be considered in assessing the cost of deliberate and opportunistic disinflations.

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Paper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series Finance and Economics Discussion Series with number 1998-01.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:1998-01
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  1. Laurence Ball, 1994. "What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy, pages 155-193 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Sharon Kozicki & Peter A. Tinsley, 1996. "Moving endpoints and the internal consistency of agents' ex ante forecasts," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 96-47, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  3. Jeff Fuhrer & George Moore, 1995. "Inflation Persistence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(1), pages 127-159.
  4. Athanasios Orphanides & David W. Wilcox, 1996. "The opportunistic approach to disinflation," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 96-24, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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  6. Robert Amano & Paul Fenton & David Tessier & Simon van Norden, 1996. "The credibility of monetary policy: a survey of the literature with some simple applications to Caanda," Meeting papers 9610001, EconWPA.
  7. Chan G. Huh & Kevin J. Lansing, 1998. "Expectations, credibility, and disinflation in a small macroeconomic model," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 98-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  8. Antulio N. Bomfim & Robert J. Tetlow & Peter von zur Muehlen & John Williams, 1997. "Expectations, learning and the costs of disinflation: experiments using the FRB/US model," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-42, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  9. Svensson, Lars E.O. & Rudebusch , Glenn, 1998. "Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting," Seminar Papers 637, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  10. Croushore, Dean & Koot, Ronald S., 1994. "A measure of federal reserve credibility," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 215-231, April.
  11. Aksoy, Yunus & Orphanides, Athanasios & Small, David & Wieland, Volker, 2005. "A quantitative exploration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation," CFS Working Paper Series 2005/19, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  12. Jeffrey C. Fuhrer & Mark A. Hooker, 1988. "Learning about monetary regime shifts in an overlapping wage contract model," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 25, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  13. King, Mervyn, 1995. "Credibility and Monetary Policy: Theory and Evidence," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 42(1), pages 1-19, February.
  14. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  15. Shiller, Robert J, 1979. "The Volatility of Long-Term Interest Rates and Expectations Models of the Term Structure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1190-1219, December.
  16. Rotemberg, Julio J, 1982. "Sticky Prices in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1187-1211, December.
  17. Peter A. Tinsley, 1993. "Fitting both data and theories: polynomial adjustment costs and error- correction decision rules," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 93-21, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  18. Flint Brayton & Eileen Mauskopf & David L. Reifschneider & Peter A. Tinsley & John Williams, 1997. "The role of expectations in the FRB/US macroeconomic model," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Apr, pages 227-245.
  19. Flint Brayton & Peter A. Tinsley, 1996. "A guide to FRB/US: a macroeconomic model of the United States," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 96-42, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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