IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedgfe/1997-42.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Expectations, learning and the costs of disinflation: experiments using the FRB/US model

Author

Listed:
  • Antulio N. Bomfim
  • Robert J. Tetlow
  • Peter von zur Muehlen
  • John Williams

Abstract

The costs of disinflation are explored using the Board's new sticky-price rational expectations macroeconometric model of the U.S. economy, FRB/US. The model nests both model consistent and `restricted-information rational' expectations. Monetary policy is governed by interest-rate reaction functions of which two are considered: the well-known Taylor rule and another rule that is more aggressive and richer in its specification, estimated using data for the last 15 years. Agents are required to learn of shifts of the inflation target using linear updating rules. The simulated costs of disinflation are compared with other estimates of sacrifice ratios.

Suggested Citation

  • Antulio N. Bomfim & Robert J. Tetlow & Peter von zur Muehlen & John Williams, 1997. "Expectations, learning and the costs of disinflation: experiments using the FRB/US model," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-42, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:1997-42
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1997/199742/199742abs.html
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/1997/199742/199742pap.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John B. Taylor, 1994. "The inflation/output variability trade-off revisited," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38, pages 21-24.
    2. Peter A. Tinsley, 1993. "Fitting both data and theories: polynomial adjustment costs and error- correction decision rules," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 93-21, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. P.A. Tinsley, 1971. "On ramps, turnpikes, and distributed lag approximations of optimal intertemporal adjustment," Special Studies Papers 15, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Huh, Chan G. & Lansing, Kevin J., 2000. "Expectations, credibility, and disinflation in a small macroeconomic model," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(1-2), pages 51-86.
    2. Athanasios Orphanides & John Williams, 2004. "Imperfect Knowledge, Inflation Expectations, and Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters,in: The Inflation-Targeting Debate, pages 201-246 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Orphanides, Athanasios & Williams, John C., 2005. "The decline of activist stabilization policy: Natural rate misperceptions, learning, and expectations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1927-1950, November.
    4. Erceg, Christopher J. & Levin, Andrew T., 2003. "Imperfect credibility and inflation persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 915-944, May.
    5. Raf Wouters & Michel Dombrecht, 2000. "Model-based inflation forecasts and monetary policy rules," Working Paper Research 01, National Bank of Belgium.
    6. David L. Reifschneider & John C. Williams, 2000. "Three lessons for monetary policy in a low-inflation era," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 936-978.
    7. René Lalonde, 2005. "Endogenous Central Bank Credibility in a Small Forward-Looking Model of the U.S. Economy," Staff Working Papers 05-16, Bank of Canada.
    8. Bomfim, Antulio N & Rudebusch, Glenn D, 2000. "Opportunistic and Deliberate Disinflation under Imperfect Credibility," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(4), pages 707-721, November.
    9. Michael T. Kiley, 2008. "Monetary policy actions and long-run inflation expectations," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2008-03, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    10. Chan G. Huh & Kevin J. Lansing, 1998. "Federal Reserve credibility and inflation scares," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 3-16.
    11. Eric Schaling & Marco Hoeberichts, 2010. "Why Speed Doesn’t Kill: Learning to Believe in Disinflation," De Economist, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 23-42, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inflation (Finance) ; Econometric models;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:1997-42. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Franz Osorio). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/frbgvus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.