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FOMC forecasts and monetary policy deliberations

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  • Ellis, Michael A.
  • Liu, Dandan

Abstract

This paper investigates the influence of the economic forecasts of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members on the committee’s policy deliberations and finds evidence that the policy preferences of only the voting Federal Reserve Bank presidents are influenced by other members’ forecasts.

Suggested Citation

  • Ellis, Michael A. & Liu, Dandan, 2016. "FOMC forecasts and monetary policy deliberations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 131-134.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:147:y:2016:i:c:p:131-134
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.033
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Romer, 2010. "A New Data Set on Monetary Policy: The Economic Forecasts of Individual Members of the FOMC," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(5), pages 951-957, August.
    2. Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Tillmann, Peter, 2011. "Do FOMC members herd?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 176-179.
    3. Fendel, Ralf & Rülke, Jan-Christoph, 2012. "Are heterogeneous FOMC forecasts consistent with the Fed’s monetary policy?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 5-7.
    4. Tillmann, Peter, 2011. "Strategic forecasting on the FOMC," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 547-553, September.
    5. Sheng, Xuguang (Simon), 2015. "Evaluating the economic forecasts of FOMC members," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 165-175.
    6. Henry W. Chappell, Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, 2005. "Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033305, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jakub Rybacki, 2019. "Are Central Banks' Research Teams Fragile Because of Groupthink?," KAE Working Papers 2019-045, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis.
    2. Guido Schultefrankenfeld, 2020. "Appropriate monetary policy and forecast disagreement at the FOMC," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 223-255, January.
    3. Jakub Rybacki, 2020. "Are Central Banks’ Research Teams Fragile Because of Groupthink in the Area of Monetary Policy? – Evidence on Inflation Targeting," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 4, pages 81-103.
    4. Yakov Ben-Haim & Maria Demertzis & Jan Willem van den End, 2017. "Fundamental uncertainty and unconventional monetary policy- an info-gap approach," Working Papers 19317, Bruegel.
    5. Ellis, Michael A. & Liu, Dandan, 2021. "FOMC policy preferences and economic policy uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    6. Corhay, Alexandre & Kind, Thilo & Kung, Howard & Morales, Gonzalo, 2021. "Discount rates, debt maturity, and the fiscal theory," SAFE Working Paper Series 323, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federal Open Market Committee; Monetary policy committees; Forecasting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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