Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Neuenkirch, Matthias & Tillmann, Peter, 2014. "Superstar Central Bankers," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100489, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "On the Optimality of Decisions made by Hub-and-Spokes Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 027, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Riboni, Alessandro & Ruge-Murcia, Francisco, 2014.
"Dissent in monetary policy decisions,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 137-154.
- Alessandro Riboni & Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2011. "Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions," Working Paper series 27_11, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
- RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2011. "Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions," Cahiers de recherche 06-2011, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2011. "Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions," Cahiers de recherche 2011-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Lähner, Tom, 2015. "Inconsistent voting behavior in the FOMC," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-546, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Jochimsen, Beate & Thomasius, Sebastian, 2014.
"The perfect finance minister: Whom to appoint as finance minister to balance the budget,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 390-408.
- Beate R. Jochimsen & Sebastian Thomasius, 2012. "The Perfect Finance Minister: Whom to Appoint as Finance Minister to Balance the Budget?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1188, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Jan Marc Berk & Beata K. Bierut, 2005. "Communication in Monetary Policy Committees," DNB Working Papers 059, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Thomas J. Pierce & Ken Rebeck, 2001. "Short‐Run Monetary Policy And The Macroeconomic Environment," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 19(4), pages 434-443, October.
- Eichler, Stefan & Lähner, Tom & Noth, Felix, 2016.
"Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting,"
VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change
145803, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Eichler, Stefan & Lähner, Tom & Noth, Felix, 2016. "Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting," IWH Discussion Papers 15/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/7718 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jan Marc Berk & Beata Bierut, 2004. "On the Optimality of Decisions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-120/2, Tinbergen Institute.
- Bennani, Hamza & Kranz, Tobias & Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2018.
"Disagreement between FOMC members and the Fed’s staff: New insights based on a counterfactual interest rate,"
Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 139-153.
- Hamza Bennani & Tobias Kranz & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2018. "Disagreement Between FOMC Members and the Fed’s Staff: New Insights Based on a Counterfactual Interest Rate," Post-Print hal-01868010, HAL.
- Nagel, Stefan & Malmendier, Ulrike M. & Yan, Zhen, 2017.
"The Making of Hawks and Doves: Inflation Experiences on the FOMC,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
11902, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ulrike Malmendier & Stefan Nagel & Zhen Yan, 2017. "The Making of Hawks and Doves: Inflation Experiences on the FOMC," NBER Working Papers 23228, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Matthias Neuenkirch & Peter Tillmann, 2016.
"Does A Good Central Banker Make A Difference?,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1541-1560, July.
- Matthias Neuenkirch & Peter Tillmann, 2013. "Does a good central banker make a difference?," Research Papers in Economics 2013-08, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
- Matthias Neuenkirch & Peter Tillmann, 2013. "Does a Good Central Banker make a Difference?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201354, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Karl Kaltenthaler, 2003. "Managing the Euro," European Union Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 329-349, September.
- Eichler, Stefan & Lähner, Tom & Noth, Felix, 2018. "Regional banking instability and FOMC voting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 282-292.
- Chappell, Henry W. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 2018. "Committee decision-making at Sweden's Riksbank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 120-133.
- Malmendier, Ulrike & Nagel, Stefan & Yan, Zhen, 2021.
"The making of hawks and doves,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 19-42.
- Malmendier, Ulrike M. & Nagel, Stefan & Yan, Zhen, 2020. "The Making of Hawks and Doves," CEPR Discussion Papers 14938, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gohlmann, Silja & Vaubel, Roland, 2007. "The educational and occupational background of central bankers and its effect on inflation: An empirical analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 925-941, May.
- Alberto Batinti, 2016. "NIH biomedical funding: evidence of executive dominance in swing-voter states during presidential elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 239-263, September.
- Bennani, Hamza & Farvaque, Etienne & Stanek, Piotr, 2018.
"Influence of regional cycles and personal background on FOMC members’ preferences and disagreement,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 416-424.
- Etienne Farvaque & Hamza Bennani & Piotr Stanek, 2018. "Influence of Regional Cycles and Personal Background on FOMC Members' Preferences and Disagreement," Post-Print hal-01589198, HAL.
- Hamza Bennani & Etienne Farvaque & Piotr Stanek, 2018. "Influence of regional cycles and personal background on FOMC members’ preferences and disagreement," Post-Print hal-04206047, HAL.
- Smales, Lee A. & Apergis, Nick, 2016. "The influence of FOMC member characteristics on the monetary policy decision-making process," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 216-231.
- Stefan Eichler & Tom Lähner, 2014. "Forecast dispersion, dissenting votes, and monetary policy preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 429-453, September.
- Sylvester Eijffinger & Ronald Mahieu & Louis Raes, 2016. "Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1628, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Christian Fahrholz & Philipp Mohl, 2004. "EMU-enlargement and the Reshaping of Decision-making within the ECB Governing Council: A Voting-Power Analysis," Eastward Enlargement of the Euro-zone Working Papers wp23, Free University Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, revised 01 Jun 2004.
- Eichler, Stefan & Lähner, Tom, 2017. "Career experience, political effects, and voting behavior in the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Committee," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 55-58.
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