Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Policy Uncertainty and the Democratic Deficit
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- Waller, Christopher J, 1989. "Monetary Policy Games and Central Bank Politics," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 422-31, November.
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- Faust, Jon, 1996. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 267-283, April.
- Henry W. Chappell & Thomas M. Havrilesky & Rob Roy McGregor, 1993. "Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through the Power of Appointment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 185-218.
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- Waller, Christopher J, 1991. "Bashing and Coercion in Monetary Policy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 1-13, January.
- Havrilesky, Thomas M, 1987. "A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(3), pages 308-25, August.
- Havrilesky, Thomas & Gildea, John A, 1992. " Reliable and Unreliable Partisan Appointees to the Board of Governors," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 397-417, June.
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