A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes
This paper indicates that income redistribution, motivated by the distributive ideals of liberal political p arties, create unanticipated disincentives for productive effort. Thi s suggests that newly-elected liberal parties are likely to engage in monetary surprises in order to compensate for the adverse effects of these disincentives on real income. Estimated reaction from function s support these predictions. A measure of income redistribution, the change in the ratio of the social expenditures of government to GNP, has a positive significant effect on money growth. In addition, when the Presidency changes from conservative to liberal, there is a posit ive and significant increase on money growth. Copyright 1987 by Ohio State University Press.
Volume (Year): 19 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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