IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mcb/jmoncb/v19y1987i3p308-25.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes

Author

Listed:
  • Havrilesky, Thomas M

Abstract

This paper indicates that income redistribution, motivated by the distributive ideals of liberal political p arties, create unanticipated disincentives for productive effort. Thi s suggests that newly-elected liberal parties are likely to engage in monetary surprises in order to compensate for the adverse effects of these disincentives on real income. Estimated reaction from function s support these predictions. A measure of income redistribution, the change in the ratio of the social expenditures of government to GNP, has a positive significant effect on money growth. In addition, when the Presidency changes from conservative to liberal, there is a posit ive and significant increase on money growth. Copyright 1987 by Ohio State University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Havrilesky, Thomas M, 1987. "A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(3), pages 308-325, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:19:y:1987:i:3:p:308-25
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2879%28198708%2919%3A3%3C308%3AAPTOFA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9&origin=bc
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1991. "Regional economic conditions and the FOMC votes of district presidents," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Mar, pages 3-16.
    2. James E. Alt, 1991. "Leaning into the Wind or Ducking out of the Storm: U.S. Monetary Policy in the 1980s," NBER Chapters,in: Politics and Economics in the Eighties, pages 41-82 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. repec:dgr:rugsom:14020-eef is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Berlemann, Michael & Markwardt, Gunther, 2003. "Partisan cycles and pre-electoral uncertainty," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 01/03, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    5. Patrick Artus, 1995. "Effets internes et internationaux de l'indépendance des banques centrales," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(3), pages 857-867.
    6. Christopher J. Ellis & Mark A. Thoma, 1991. "Causality In Political Business Cycles," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 9(2), pages 39-49, April.
    7. Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1991. "Are district presidents more conservative than board governors?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 3-12.
    8. Pantzalis, Christos & Stangeland, David A. & Turtle, Harry J., 2000. "Political elections and the resolution of uncertainty: The international evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(10), pages 1575-1604, October.
    9. Garcia De Paso, Jose I., 2000. "Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank: Policy Uncertainty and the Democratic Deficit," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 471-489, July.
    10. Kuper, Gerard & Veurink, Jan Hessel, 2014. "Central bank independence and political pressure in the Greenspan era," Research Report 14020-EEF, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    11. Niklas Potrafke, 2017. "Government Ideology and Economic Policy-Making in the United States," CESifo Working Paper Series 6444, CESifo Group Munich.
    12. Faust, Jon, 1996. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 267-283, April.
    13. José I. Garcia de Paso, 1996. "A partisan model of political monetary cycles," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(2), pages 243-262, May.
    14. Jamshidi, A., 2000. "The Financial System and Monetary Policy in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Other publications TiSEM 743c8f2b-8a0d-4580-8cc7-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1993. "Central bank independence : Theory and evidence (Revised version)," Discussion Paper 1993-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    16. Jon Faust, 1992. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," International Finance Discussion Papers 429, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    17. van Lelyveld, Iman, 1999. "Inflation or unemployment? Who cares?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 463-484, September.
    18. Dodge Cahan & Niklas Potrafke, 2017. "The Democratic-Republican Presidential Growth Gap and the Partisan Balance of the State Governments," CESifo Working Paper Series 6517, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:19:y:1987:i:3:p:308-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.