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Fomc Voting Behavior And Electoral Cycles: Partisan Ideology And Partisan Loyalty

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  • Rob Roy McGregor

Abstract

The influence of partisan and electoral considerations on the monetary policy voting behavior of Federal Reserve Governors is investigated in the context of a model permitting the estimation of reaction functions on the basis of FOMC voting records. The results suggest that once we have controlled for the state of the economy and for the prevailing stance of monetary policy, both partisan ideologies and partisan loyalties appear to play an important role in the Governors’voting calculus.

Suggested Citation

  • Rob Roy McGregor, 1996. "Fomc Voting Behavior And Electoral Cycles: Partisan Ideology And Partisan Loyalty," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 17-32, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:8:y:1996:i:1:p:17-32
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1996.tb00118.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Roland Vaubel, 2009. "Constitutional courts as promoters of political centralization: lessons for the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 203-222, December.
    2. Hamza Bennani, 2015. "Dissecting the brains of central bankers: The case of the ECB’s Governing Council members on reforms," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 141, pages 97-114.
    3. Henry W. Chappell & Rob Roy McGregor, 2000. "A Long History of FOMC Voting Behavior," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(4), pages 906-922, April.
    4. Dodge Cahan & Luisa Doerr & Niklas Potrafke, 2019. "Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 215-238, December.
    5. Niklas Potrafke, 2018. "Government ideology and economic policy-making in the United States—a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 145-207, January.
    6. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
    7. Rebecca Hellerstein, 2007. "Is There a Dead Spot? New Evidence on FOMC Decisions Before Elections," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(6), pages 1411-1427, September.
    8. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
    9. Arnab Bhattacharjee & Sean Holly, 2010. "Rational Partisan Theory, Uncertainty, And Spatial Voting: Evidence For The Bank Of England'S Mpc," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 151-179, July.
    10. Vaubel, Roland, 1999. "The Future of the Euro : A Public Choice Perspective," Discussion Papers 570, Institut fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre und Statistik, Abteilung fuer Volkswirtschaftslehre.
    11. Chappell, Henry W. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 2018. "Committee decision-making at Sweden's Riksbank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 120-133.
    12. Diaf, Sami, 2022. "Policy preference at central banks: Quantifying monetary policy signals using keyword topic models," WiSo-HH Working Paper Series 69, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, WISO Research Laboratory.
    13. Ansgar Belke & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries," Ruhr Economic Papers 0094, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    14. Gohlmann, Silja & Vaubel, Roland, 2007. "The educational and occupational background of central bankers and its effect on inflation: An empirical analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 925-941, May.
    15. Ayse Kaya & Stephen Golub & Mark Kuperberg & Feng Lin, 2019. "The Federal Reserve'S Dual Mandate And The Inflation‐Unemployment Tradeoff," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(4), pages 641-651, October.
    16. Vaubel Roland, 2009. "Lehren aus der Finanzkrise: Rolle des Staates und internationale Dimension / Lessons from the financial crisis: The role of government and the international dimension," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 60(1), pages 247-266, January.
    17. Berlemann, Michael & Markwardt, Gunther, 2003. "Partisan cycles and pre-electoral uncertainty," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 01/03, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
    18. Carmignani Fabrizio & Colombo Emilio & Tirelli Patrizio, 2008. "Economic and Socio-Political Determinants of de Facto Monetary Institutions and Inflationary Outcomes," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-29, November.
    19. Emile van Ommeren & Giulia Piccillo, 2021. "The Central Bank Governor and Interest Rate Setting by Committee," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 67(2), pages 155-185.
    20. Dreher, Axel & Vaubel, Roland, 2009. "Foreign exchange intervention and the political business cycle: A panel data analysis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 755-775, September.
    21. Berlemann, Michael & Markwardt, Gunther, 2006. "Variable rational partisan cycles and electoral uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 874-886, December.
    22. Strong, Christine & Yayi, Constant L., 2023. "The political affiliation of central bankers and government debt: Evidence from Africa," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 603-620.
    23. Roland Vaubel, 2004. "The Future of the Euro: A Public Choice Approach," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 24(1-2), pages 151-161, Spring/Su.
    24. Michael Berlemann & Gunther Markwardt, 2007. "Unemployment and Inflation Consequences of Unexpected Election Results," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(8), pages 1919-1945, December.
    25. Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "Reply to Berger and Woitek," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 823-827, December.

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