Fomc Voting Behavior And Electoral Cycles: Partisan Ideology And Partisan Loyalty
The influence of partisan and electoral considerations on the monetary policy voting behavior of Federal Reserve Governors is investigated in the context of a model permitting the estimation of reaction functions on the basis of FOMC voting records. The results suggest that once we have controlled for the state of the economy and for the prevailing stance of monetary policy, both partisan ideologies and partisan loyalties appear to play an important role in the Governors'voting calculus. Copyright 1996 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
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Volume (Year): 8 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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