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Dissecting the brains of central bankers: The case of the ECB’s Governing Council members on reforms

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  • Hamza Bennani

Abstract

Since 2009, European central bankers have supported some reforms, in order to draw roadmaps to get out of the euro debt crisis. This paper tests whether the educational and professional background of European central bankers matter for the type of reforms each of them advocated. Through a textual analysis of public speeches delivered by the European central bankers, we draw a cognitive map for each of them and, thus, of the reforms they propose as ways out of the euro debt crisis. Our results show that their occupational background is an important determinant of their respective economic reform proposals.

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  • Hamza Bennani, 2015. "Dissecting the brains of central bankers: The case of the ECB’s Governing Council members on reforms," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 141, pages 97-114.
  • Handle: RePEc:cii:cepiie:2015-q1-141-6
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    Cited by:

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    2. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Oriola, Hugo, 2023. "Political monetary cycles: An empirical study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    4. Johnson, Juliet & Arel-Bundock, Vincent & Portniaguine, Vladislav, 2018. "Adding rooms onto a house we love: Central banking after the Global Financial Crisis," SocArXiv bms5n, Center for Open Science.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European central bank; Monetary policy; Euro debt crisis; Cognitive mapping;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management

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