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Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?

  • Donato Masciandaro

This paper reviews recent advances on the role of the central bank in the money supply process and its effects on inflation. The literature is presented according to a three-stage process, with the central bank acting first as social player, then as monetary agent, and finally as a combined monetary and banking agent. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF01000390
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review.

Volume (Year): 6 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 399-410

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Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:6:y:1995:i:4:p:399-410
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  1. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
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  3. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, J├╝rgen & Waller, Christopher, 1993. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  6. Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers sp52, Financial Markets Group.
  7. Bernholz, Peter, 1983. "Inflation and Monetary Constitutions in Historical Perspective," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 397-419.
  8. Blackburn, Keith & Christensen, Michael, 1989. "Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-45, March.
  9. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 619-30, October.
  10. Robert J. Barro, 1983. "Inflationary Finance under Discretion and Rules," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 1-16, February.
  11. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
  12. Waller, Christopher J, 1992. "The Choice of a Conservative Central Banker in a Multisector Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1006-12, September.
  13. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  14. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  15. Richard C.K. Burdekin & Leroy O. Laney, 1986. "Fiscal policymaking and the central bank institutional constraint," Research Paper 8606, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  16. Waller, Christopher J, 1991. "Bashing and Coercion in Monetary Policy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 1-13, January.
  17. Waller, Christopher J, 1989. "Monetary Policy Games and Central Bank Politics," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 21(4), pages 422-31, November.
  18. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Alberto Alesina, 1987. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt in a Democracy," UCLA Economics Working Papers 435, UCLA Department of Economics.
  20. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
  21. Carl E. Walsh, 1993. "Optimal contracts for independent central bankers: private information, performance measures and reappointment," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 93-02, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  22. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  23. Alex Cukierman, 1986. "Central bank behavior and credibility: some recent theoretical developments," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 5-17.
  24. Patricia S. Pollard, 1993. "Central bank independence and economic performance," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 21-36.
  25. Masciandaro, Donato & Spinelli, Franco, 1994. "Central Banks' Independence: Institutional Determinants, Rankings and Central Bankers' Views," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 41(4), pages 434-43, November.
  26. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1993. "Central bank independence : Searching for the philosophers' stone," Other publications TiSEM d03f4f9d-9979-4f97-b9be-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  27. L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
  28. Waller, Christopher J., 1992. "A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 411-428, June.
  29. Nordhaus, William D, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 169-90, April.
  30. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
  31. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
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