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Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers

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  • Masciandaro, Donato
  • Volpicella, Alessio

Abstract

The Great Crisis has highlighted the importance of establishing macro prudential architectures to address problems of financial stability. Central banks are always part of macro prudential settings, but their role is far from being homogeneous across countries, reflecting the fact that according to economic theory there are pros and cons in extending central bank influence to macro prudential supervision. The issue is then genuinely empirical: are there any meaningful drivers explaining the actual choices made by policymakers about the central bank's role in macro prudential governance?

Suggested Citation

  • Masciandaro, Donato & Volpicella, Alessio, 2016. "Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 101-119.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:61:y:2016:i:c:p:101-119
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2015.11.002
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    11. Patricia C Mosser, 2017. "Discussion of New Financial Stability Governance and Central Banks," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Jonathan Hambur & John Simon (ed.),Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in a World of Low Interest Rates, Reserve Bank of Australia.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Macro prudential supervision; Micro prudential supervision; Central bank independence; Monetary policy rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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