Central banks and financial stability: a survey
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Martin Summer, 2003.
"Banking Regulation and Systemic Risk,"
Open Economies Review,
Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 43-70, January.
- Garry J. Schinasi, 2003. "Responsibility of Central Banks for Stability in Financial Markets," IMF Working Papers 03/121, International Monetary Fund.
- Andrew Crockett, 1997. "Why is financial stability a goal of public policy?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q IV, pages 5-22.
- Michael Taylor & Marc Quintyn, 2002. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," IMF Working Papers 02/46, International Monetary Fund.
- By Charles Enoch & Gillian Garcia & V. Sundararajan, 2001. "Recapitalizing Banks with Public Funds," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(1), pages 3.
- Charles Goodhart, 1999. "Myths About the Lender of Last Resort," FMG Special Papers sp120, Financial Markets Group.
- Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
- Edward J. Frydl & Marc Quintyn, 2000. "The Benefits and Costs of Intervening in Banking Crises," IMF Working Papers 00/147, International Monetary Fund.
- Andrew Crockett, 1997. "Why is financial stability a goal of public policy?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 7-36.
- Jakob de Haan & Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, 2000. "The Democratic Accountability of the European Central Bank: A Comment on Two Fairy-tales," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 393-407, 09.
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