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Transparency and accountability of central banks in their role of financial stability supervisor in OECD countries

  • Jakob Haan

    ()

  • Sander Oosterloo

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10657-006-0400-6
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Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 22 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 255-271

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Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:22:y:2006:i:3:p:255-271
DOI: 10.1007/s10657-006-0400-6
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/journal/10657

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  1. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & van Rooij, M. & Schaling, E., 1996. "Central Bank Independence : A Panel Data Approach," Other publications TiSEM edfc8450-16c6-4539-be31-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  2. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1130, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Berger, Helge & de Haan, Jakob & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, 2000. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2353, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. de Bandt, Olivier & Hartmann, Philipp, 2000. "Systemic Risk: A Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 2634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-60, October.
  6. Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, 2003. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 49(2), pages 259-294.
  7. Charles Goodhart, 2000. "The Organisational Structure of Banking Supervision," FMG Special Papers sp127, Financial Markets Group.
  8. Barth, James R. & Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Levine, Ross, 2004. "Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 205-248, April.
  9. W.H. Buiter, 1999. "Alice in Euroland," CEP Discussion Papers dp0423, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  10. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "Monetary Policy and Real Stabilization," NBER Working Papers 9486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Garry J. Schinasi, 2003. "Responsibility of Central Banks for Stability in Financial Markets," IMF Working Papers 03/121, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Andrew D. Crockett, 1997. "Why is financial stability a goal of public policy?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 7-36.
  13. McDonough, William J, 2002. "Promoting Financial Stability," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 115-27, Spring.
  14. Martin Summer, 2003. "Banking Regulation and Systemic Risk," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 43-70, January.
  15. Bilin Neyapti & Nergiz Dincer, 2005. "Measuring the Quality of Bank Regulation and Supervision with an Application to Transition Economies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(1), pages 79-99, January.
  16. Oosterloo, Sander & de Haan, Jakob, 2004. "Central banks and financial stability: a survey," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 257-273, December.
  17. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  18. Andrew D. Crockett, 1997. "Why is financial stability a goal of public policy?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q IV, pages 5-22.
  19. Udaibir S Das & Marc G Quintyn & Kina Chenard, 2004. "Does Regulatory Governance Matter for Financial System Stability? An Empirical Analysis," IMF Working Papers 04/89, International Monetary Fund.
  20. Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn King, 1996. "Independence and Accountability," Bank of England working papers 49, Bank of England.
  21. Jakob de Haan & Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, 2000. "The Democratic Accountability of the European Central Bank: A Comment on Two Fairy-tales," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 393-407, 09.
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