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Financial governance of banking supervision

Listed author(s):
  • Donato Masciandaro

    ()

    (University of Bocconi - Department of Economics (DEP))

  • María J. Nieto

    ()

    (Banco de España)

  • Henriëtte Prast

    ()

    (de Nederlandsche Bank (Netherlands Central Bank))

This article analyses the economics of financing banking supervision and attempts to respond to two questions: What are the most common financing practices? Can the differences in current financing practices be explained by country specific factors? We perform an empirical analysis that identifies the determinants of the financing structure of banks´ prudential supervision using a sample of 90 banking supervisors (central banks and financial authorities). We conclude that supervisors in central banks are more likely publicly funded, while financial authorities are more likely funded via a levy on the regulated banks. The financing rule is also explained by the structure of the financial systems. Public funding is more likely in bank oriented structures. Finally, the geographical factor is also significant: European bank supervisors are more oriented towards the private funding regime. In general, we do not find evidence of the role of the political factor, the size of the economy, the level of development and the legal tradition.

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File URL: http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/DocumentosTrabajo/07/Fic/dt0725e.pdf
File Function: First version, July 2007
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Paper provided by Banco de España & Working Papers Homepage in its series Working Papers with number 0725.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2007
Handle: RePEc:bde:wpaper:0725
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.bde.es/

Web page: http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/informes/Publicaciones_se/docs/
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  9. Masciandaro, Donato, 2007. "Divide et impera: Financial supervision unification and central bank fragmentation effect," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 285-315, June.
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  15. Larry Wall & Maria Nieto, 2006. "Precondition for a Successful Implementation of Supervisors' Primpt Corrective Action: Is There a Case for a Banking Standard in the EU?," FMG Special Papers sp165, Financial Markets Group.
  16. Frisell, Lars & Roszbach, Kasper & spagnolo, giancarlo, 2008. "Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks," Working Paper Series 221, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  17. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 1999. "Bank-based and market-based financial systems - cross-country comparisons," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2143, The World Bank.
  18. Giorgio Di Giorgio & Carmine Di Noia & Laura Piatti, 2000. "Financial Market Regulation: The Case of Italy and a Proposal for the Euro Area," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-24, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  19. Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, 2003. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 49(2), pages 259-294.
  20. Gillian Garcia & Henriette Prast, 2003. "Depositor and Investor Protection in the EU and the Netherlands: A Brief History," Research Series Supervision (discontinued) 54, Netherlands Central Bank, Directorate Supervision.
  21. Michael W Taylor & Marc G Quintyn & Eva H. G. Hüpkes, 2005. "The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors; Principles and Practice," IMF Working Papers 05/51, International Monetary Fund.
  22. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2001. "Law, politics, and finance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2585, The World Bank.
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