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Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?

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  • Mayes, David G.
  • Nieto, María J.
  • Wall, Larry

Abstract

This paper presents a stylized mechanism aimed at dealing with the cross border agency problems that arise in supervising and resolving cross border banking groups in the European Union (EU). The authors assume that PCA policies have been implemented by the national supervisors and explore the institutional changes needed in Europe if PCA is to be effective as an incentive compatible mechanism. The paper identifies these changes starting with enhancements in the availability of information on banking groups to supervisors. Next, the paper considers the collective decision making by supervisors with authority to make discretionary decisions within the PCA framework as soon as a bank of a cross border banking group falls below the minimum capital standard. Finally, the paper analyzes the coordination measures that should be implemented if PCA requires the bank to be resolved.
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Suggested Citation

  • Mayes, David G. & Nieto, María J. & Wall, Larry, 2008. "Multiple safety net regulators and agency problems in the EU: Is Prompt Corrective Action partly the solution?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 232-257, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:4:y:2008:i:3:p:232-257
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kahn, Charles M. & Santos, Joao A.C., 2005. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2107-2136, November.
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    4. Llewellyn, David T. & Mayes, David G., 2003. "The role of market discipline in handling problem banks," Research Discussion Papers 21/2003, Bank of Finland.
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    6. Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2007. "Cross-border banking: challenges for deposit insurance and financial stability in the European Union," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    7. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Working Papers 238, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    8. Larry Wall & Maria Nieto, 2006. "Precondition for a Successful Implementation of Supervisors' Primpt Corrective Action: Is There a Case for a Banking Standard in the EU?," FMG Special Papers sp165, Financial Markets Group.
    9. Dirk Schoenmaker & Charles Goodhart, 2006. "Burden Sharing in a Banking Crisis in Europe," FMG Special Papers sp164, Financial Markets Group.
    10. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2005. "How Big a Problem is Too Big to Fail?," NBER Working Papers 11814, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, 1988. "Risk and solvency regulation of depository institutions: past policies and current options," Staff Memoranda 88-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    12. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2002. "Subordinated debt and prompt corrective regulatory action," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2002-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    13. Rafael Repullo, 2005. "Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(2), pages -, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel C. Hardy & María J. Nieto, 2011. "Cross-border coordination of prudential supervision And deposit guarantees," Working Papers 1126, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    2. Wall, Larry D., 2009. "Prudential Discipline for Financial Firms: Micro, Macro, and Market Structures," ADBI Working Papers 176, Asian Development Bank Institute.
    3. Hertig Gerard & Lee Ruben & McCahery Joseph A., 2010. "Empowering the ECB to Supervise Banks: A Choice-Based Approach," European Company and Financial Law Review, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 171-215, January.
    4. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    5. George G. Kaufman, 2007. "A Program for Minimizing the Private and Public Costs of Bank Failures," NFI Policy Briefs 2007-PB-11, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    6. Jens Hagendorff & Maria J. Nieto & Larry D. Wall, 2012. "The safety and soundness effects of bank M&A in the EU," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2012-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    7. David G. Mayes, 2008. "Avoiding the Next Crisis," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(4), pages 44-50, December.
    8. Jens Hagendorff & María J. Nieto & Larry D. Wall, 2012. "The safety and soundness effects of bank M&As in the EU: does prudential regulation have any impact?," Working Papers 1236, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    9. Iain Begg, 2009. "Regulation and Supervision of Financial Intermediaries in the EU: The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47, pages 1107-1128, November.
    10. Masciandaro, Donato & Nieto, Maria J. & Quintyn, Marc, 2011. "Exploring governance of the new European Banking AuthorityâA case for harmonization?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 204-214, December.
    11. Jean Pisani-Ferry & André Sapir, 2009. "Banking Crisis Management in the EU: An Interim Assessment," Working Papers 359, Bruegel.
    12. David G. Mayes, 2011. "Early Intervention and Prompt Corrective Action in Europe," Chapters,in: The Financial Crisis and the Regulation of Finance, chapter 10 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. David G. Mayes, 2009. "Banking Crisis Resolution Policy - Lessons from Recent Experience - which elements are needed for robust and efficient crisis resolution?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2823, CESifo Group Munich.
    14. Larry D. Wall, 2012. "Enlisting Macroprudential and Market Regulatory Structures to Strengthen Prudential Supervision," Chapters,in: Implications of the Global Financial Crisis for Financial Reform and Regulation in Asia, chapter 3 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. repec:ces:ifodic:v:6:y:2008:i:3:p:14567250 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Gillian G. H. Garcia, 2009. "Sovereignty Versus Soundness: Cross-Border/Interstate Banking In The European Union And In The United States: Similarities, Differences And Policy Issues," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(1), pages 109-129, January.
    17. Gillian G.H. Garcia & Rosa M. Lastra & María J. Nieto, 2009. "Bankruptcy and reorganization procedures for cross-border banks in the EU: Towards an integrated approach to the reform of the EU safety net," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 17(3), pages 240-276, July.
    18. Gillian G.H.Garcia & Rosa M. Lastra & Maria J. Nieto, 2009. "Bankruptcy and reorganisation procedures for cross-border banks in the EU: Towards an integrated approach to the reform of the EU safety net," FMG Special Papers sp186, Financial Markets Group.
    19. Donato Masciandaro & Maria J. Nieto & Marc Quintyn, 2011. "Will They Sing the Same Tune? Measuring Convergence in the New European System of Financial Supervisors," Chapters,in: Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 17 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Maria J. Nieto & Garry J. Schinasi, 2008. "Towards an EU Framework for Safeguarding Financial Stability," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 6(3), pages 27-36, October.
    21. Hardy, Daniel C. & Nieto, Maria J., 2011. "Cross-border coordination of prudential supervision and deposit guarantees," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 155-164, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General

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