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Who pays for bank insolvency in transition and emerging economies?

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  • Mayes, David G.

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  • Mayes, David G., 2005. "Who pays for bank insolvency in transition and emerging economies?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 161-181, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:29:y:2005:i:1:p:161-181
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    1. Philippe Aghion & Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, 1994. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," NBER Chapters, in: The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, Restructuring, pages 215-244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Carmen M. Reinhart & Graciela L. Kaminsky, 1999. "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 473-500, June.
    3. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2002. "Subordinated debt and prompt corrective regulatory action," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2002-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    4. Mr. Haizhou Huang & Mr. C. A. E. Goodhart, 1999. "A Model of the Lender of Last Resort," IMF Working Papers 1999/039, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Jenny Corbett & Janet Mitchell, 2000. "Banking crises and bank rescues: the effect of reputation," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 474-517.
    6. Mr. Andy M. Wolfe & Mr. Jeffrey M. Davis & Mr. James Daniel, 1997. "Fiscal Accounting of Bank Restructuring," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 1997/005, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-560, October.
    8. King, Mervyn, 1994. "Debt deflation: Theory and evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 419-445, April.
    9. Charles A. E. Goodhart & Haizhou Huang, 1999. "A model of the lender of last resort," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    10. Beck, Thorsten, 2003. "The incentive-compatible design of deposit insurance and bank failure resolution : concepts and country studies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3043, The World Bank.
    11. De Luna-Martinez, J., 2000. "Management and Resolution of Banking Crises. Lessons from the Republic of Korea and Mexico," World Bank - Discussion Papers 413, World Bank.
    12. Robert A. Eisenbeis & Larry D. Wall, 2002. "The major supervisory initiatives post-FDICIA: Are they based on the goals of PCA? Should they be?," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2002-31, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    13. David G. Mayes & Liisa Halme & Aarno Liuksila, 2001. "Improving Banking Supervision," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-28819-5, December.
    14. Ron J. Feldman & Gary H. Stern, 2003. "Too big to fail: the hazards of bank bailouts," The Region, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 17(Dec), pages 60-65.
    15. Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, 2000. "Market discipline in the governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: monitoring vs. influencing," Working Paper Series WP-00-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    16. repec:cep:stitep:/1992/250 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. International Monetary Fund, 2002. "Banking Crises and Bank Resolution: Experiences in Some Transition Economies," IMF Working Papers 2002/056, International Monetary Fund.
    18. Haizhou Huang & Charles Goodhart, 1999. "A Simple Model of an International Lender of Last Resort," FMG Discussion Papers dp336, Financial Markets Group.
    19. Mr. James Daniel, 1997. "Fiscal Aspects of Bank Restructuring," IMF Working Papers 1997/052, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    2. Sorana Vătavu & Marilen Pirtea & Sorin Vătavu, 2011. "A Review of Financial Regulations to Avoid the Nationalisation of Losses in the Banking System," Annals of the University of Petrosani, Economics, University of Petrosani, Romania, vol. 11(1), pages 277-288.
    3. Anastasiou, Dimitrios & Drakos, Konstantinos, 2021. "European depositors’ behavior and crisis sentiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 117-136.
    4. Claeys, Sophie, 2005. "Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 7/2005, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    5. repec:zbw:bofitp:2005_007 is not listed on IDEAS

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