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Who pays for bank insolvency?

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  • Mayes, David G.

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  • Mayes, David G., 2004. "Who pays for bank insolvency?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 515-551, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:23:y:2004:i:3:p:515-551
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peura, Samu & Jokivuolle, Esa, 2003. "Simulation-based stress testing of banks' regulatory capital adequacy," Research Discussion Papers 4/2003, Bank of Finland.
    2. Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, 1986. "Inherent Instability in Banking: The Free Banking Experience," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(3), pages 877-890, Winter.
    3. James Daniel, 1997. "Fiscal Aspects of Bank Restructuring," IMF Working Papers 97/52, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Philippe Aghion & Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, 1994. "The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform," NBER Chapters,in: The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: Restructuring, pages 215-244 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Michael Bordo & Barry Eichengreen & Daniela Klingebiel & Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, 2001. "Is the crisis problem growing more severe?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 51-82, April.
    6. Samu Peura & Esa Jokivuolle, 2004. "Simulation-based stress testing of banks’ regulatory capital adequacy," Finance 0405003, EconWPA.
    7. Llewellyn, David T. & Mayes, David G., 2003. "The role of market discipline in handling problem banks," Research Discussion Papers 21/2003, Bank of Finland.
    8. Perotti, Enrico C. & Suarez, Javier, 2002. "Last bank standing: What do I gain if you fail?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1599-1622, October.
    9. De Luna-Martinez, J., 2000. "Management and Resolution of Banking Crises. Lessons from the Republic of Korea and Mexico," World Bank - Discussion Papers 413, World Bank.
    10. Robert A. Eisenbeis & Larry D. Wall, 2002. "The major supervisory initiatives post-FDICIA: Are they based on the goals of PCA? Should they be?," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2002-31, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    11. repec:hrv:faseco:30728041 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. De Bandt, Olivier & Hartmann, Philipp, 2000. "Systemic risk: A survey," Working Paper Series 0035, European Central Bank.
    13. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. " Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    14. Wheelock David C. & Kumbhakar Subal C., 1994. "The Slack Banker Dances: Deposit Insurance and Risk-Taking in the Banking Collapse of the 1920s," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 357-375, July.
    15. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    16. Gorton, Gary, 1988. "Banking Panics and Business Cycles," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(4), pages 751-781, December.
    17. Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, 2002. "Subordinated debt and prompt corrective regulatory action," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2002-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    18. Berger, Allen N. & King, Kathleen Kuester & O'Brien, James M., 1991. "The limitations of market value accounting and a more realistic alternative," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 753-783, September.
    19. Larry D. Wall, 2010. "Too-big-to-fail after FDICIA," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    20. Wheelock, David C & Kumbhakar, Subal C, 1995. "Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 186-201, February.
    21. Honohan, Patrick & Klingebiel, Daniela, 2000. "Controlling the fiscal costs of banking crises," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2441, The World Bank.
    22. Calomiris, Charles W., 1999. "Building an incentive-compatible safety net," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1499-1519, October.
    23. Hoggarth, Glenn & Reis, Ricardo & Saporta, Victoria, 2002. "Costs of banking system instability: Some empirical evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 825-855, May.
    24. Edward J Frydl & Marc G Quintyn, 2000. "The Benefits and Costs of Intervening in Banking Crises," IMF Working Papers 00/147, International Monetary Fund.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Beck, Thorsten & Laeven, Luc, 2006. "Resolution of failed banks by deposit insurers : cross-country evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3920, The World Bank.
    2. Laurence Scialom, 2007. "Pour une politique d'actions correctives précoces dans l'Union européenne : les carences institutionnelles et légales," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 89(3), pages 111-121.
    3. George G. Kaufman, 2007. "A Program for Minimizing the Private and Public Costs of Bank Failures," NFI Policy Briefs 2007-PB-11, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    4. Harrison, Ian & Anderson, Steve & Twaddle, James, 2007. "Pre-positioning for effective resolution of bank failures," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 324-341, December.
    5. David G. Mayes, 2012. "Moral Hazard, Bank Resolution and the Protection of Depositors," Chapters,in: Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance, chapter 14 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. DeYoung, Robert & Kowalik, Michal & Reidhill, Jack, 2013. "A theory of failed bank resolution: Technological change and political economics," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 612-627.
    7. Robert A. Eisenbeis & George G. Kaufman, 2007. "Cross-border banking: challenges for deposit insurance and financial stability in the European Union," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    8. Martin Cihak & Jörg Decressin, 2007. "The Case for a European Banking Charter," IMF Working Papers 07/173, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Wald Nowotny, 2013. "The Economics of Financial Regulation," Chapters,in: Stability of the Financial System, chapter 15 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. David G. Mayes, 2008. "Avoiding the Next Crisis," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(4), pages 44-50, December.
    11. Mayes, David G., 2004. "An approach to bank insolvency in transition and emerging economies," Research Discussion Papers 4/2004, Bank of Finland.
    12. Sonia Ondo-Ndong & Laurence Scialom, 2008. "Northern Rock: The anatomy of a crisis – the prudential lessons," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-23, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    13. George Kaufman, 2004. "Bank regulation and foreign-owned banks," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 67, june.
    14. Mälkönen, Ville, 2004. "Capital adequacy regulation and financial conglomerates," Research Discussion Papers 10/2004, Bank of Finland.

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