Last bank standing: What do I gain if you fail?
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- Perotti, Enrico & Suarez, Javier, 2001. "Last Bank Standing: What Do I Gain if You Fail?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Enrico C. Perotti & Javier Suarez, 2001. "Last Bank Standing: What Do I Gain If You Fail?," Working Papers wp2001_0109, CEMFI.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
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