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Passive Creditors

  • Koen Schoors

    ()

    (CERISE, Ghent University, Belgium, and WDI, University of Michigan Business School)

  • Konstantin Sonin

    ()

    (New Economic School/CEFIR, Moscow)

Creditors are often passive because they are reluctant to show bad debts on their balance sheets. We propose a simple general equilibrium model to study the externality effect of creditor passivity. The model yields rich insights in the phenomenon of creditor passivity, both in transitional and developed market economies. Policy implications are deduced. The model also explains in what respect banks differ from enterprises and what this implies for policy. Commonly observed phenomena in the banking sector, such as deposit insurance, lender of last resort facilities, government coordination to work out bad loans and special bank closure provisions, are interpreted in our framework.

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Paper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0015.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0015
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