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Démonétisation en Russie. Un arbitrage favorable au maintien de l'emploi


  • Sophie Brana
  • Mathilde Maurel


[fre] Démonétisation en Russie. Un arbitrage favorable au maintien de l'emploi. . La démonétisation de l'économie russe est le produit d'une politique monétaire restrictive conjuguée au maintien de la contrainte budgétaire douce. L'État, qui autorise les arriérés fiscaux ou l'acquittement des impôts en nature, et les entreprises, qui accumulent des arriérés salariaux, arbitrent à court terme en faveur du maintien de l'emploi dans des entreprises qui diffèrent la restructuration. Le chômage est corrélé positivement à long terme aux arriérés fiscaux et salariaux, mais à court terme l'augmentation de ces derniers influence positivement l'évolution de l'emploi. [eng] Russian arrears: a trade-of in favour of employment. . The increase in non-monetary payments in Russia is the output of both a tight monetary policy and the persistence of the soft budget constraint. The State, by allowing fiscal arrears and in-kind payments, and the enterprises, by using wage arrears as a way of accommodating the budget constraint, make a short term arbitrage which favours the level of employment and further delay in restructuring. Unemployment is positively correlated in the long run with fiscal and wage arrears, but in the short run, any increase in the latter has a positive impact on the fluctuation of employment.

Suggested Citation

  • Sophie Brana & Mathilde Maurel, 2001. "Démonétisation en Russie. Un arbitrage favorable au maintien de l'emploi," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 52(4), pages 841-859.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_num_52_4_410361
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.2001.410361
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.2001.410361

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    Cited by:

    1. Catherine Locatelli & Dominique Finon, 2003. "Les limites à l'introduction des institutions de marché dans un secteur de rente," Post-Print halshs-00177824, HAL.
    2. Koen Schoors & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "Passive Creditors," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 57-86, July.
    3. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1301-1338.
    4. Catherine Locatelli, 2002. "La faisabilité de la libéralisation de l'industrie gazière russe," Post-Print halshs-00177826, HAL.
    5. Catherine Locatelli & Dominique Finon, 2004. "L'échec de l'introduction d'institutions de marché dans une économie en transition : les limites du consensus de Washington dans un secteur de rente," Post-Print halshs-00001306, HAL.
    6. Catherine Locatelli & Dominique Finon, 2004. "The failure of introducing market institutions in a rent sector into an economy in transition," Post-Print halshs-00001302, HAL.

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    JEL classification:

    • P2 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies


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