The failure of introducing market institutions in a rent sector into an economy in transition
Privatisation is at the heart of the structural reforms for economies in transition. In theory, the main aim of privatisation is to change the structures of corporate governance in order to improve the efficiency of the enterprises and to assure their long-term future in a competitive environment. The adoption of formal market institutions would be sufficient to secure the new property rights, in particular because the new holders of the rights to control assets would have a great incentive to encourage the definition of new judicial rules that would guarantee their rights of ownership. In Russia that didn't happen.
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