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Dynamic inconsistency of capital forbearance: Long-run vs. short-run effects of too-big-to-fail policymaking

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  • Kane, Edward J.

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  • Kane, Edward J., 2001. "Dynamic inconsistency of capital forbearance: Long-run vs. short-run effects of too-big-to-fail policymaking," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 281-299, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:9:y:2001:i:4:p:281-299
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2003. "Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 300-330, October.
    2. C. H. Furfine, 1999. "Interbank exposures: quantifying the risk of contagion," BIS Working Papers 70, Bank for International Settlements.
    3. Walker F. Todd & James B. Thomson, 1990. "An insider's view of the political economy of the too big to fail doctrine," Working Paper 9017, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    4. Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton & Steven Fries, 1999. "Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 1-51, March.
    5. Charles A. E. Goodhart & Haizhou Huang, 1999. "A model of the lender of last resort," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    6. Haizhou Huang & Charles Goodhart, 1999. "A Simple Model of an International Lender of Last Resort," FMG Discussion Papers dp336, Financial Markets Group.
    7. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Guzman, Andrew T, 1999. "An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 775-808, October.
    8. Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, 1999. "Bond market discipline of banks: is the market tough enough?," Staff Reports 95, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    9. Paul Hoffman & Anthony M. Santomero, 1998. "Problem Bank Resolution: Evaluating the Options," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-05, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    10. Xavier Freixas, 1999. "Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity," Economics Working Papers 400, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre C. Boyer & Jorge Ponce, 2011. "Central Banks and Banking Supervision Reform," Chapters,in: Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Kane, Edward J., 2002. "Resolving systemic financial crises efficiently," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 217-226, June.
    3. Boyer, Pierre C. & Ponce, Jorge, 2012. "Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 206-217.
    4. Pierre C. Boyer & Jorge Ponce, 2010. "Central banks, regulatory capture and banking supervision reform," Documentos de trabajo 2010003, Banco Central del Uruguay.
    5. Duan, Jin-Chuan & Yu, Min-Teh, 2005. "Fair insurance guaranty premia in the presence of risk-based capital regulations, stochastic interest rate and catastrophe risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(10), pages 2435-2454, October.
    6. David T. Llewellyn, 2001. "A regulatory regime for financial stability," Working Papers 48, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    7. Agur, Itai, 2013. "Multiple bank regulators and risk taking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 259-268.

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