An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies
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- Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies," NBER Working Papers 6521, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
- Schwartz, Alan, 1993. "Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 595-632, April.
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- Mihir A. Desai & C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, 2004.
"A Multinational Perspective on Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets,"
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- Lóránth, Gyöngyi & Morrison, Alan, 2003. "Multinational Bank Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 4148, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Fritz Foley, C. & Hartzell, Jay C. & Titman, Sheridan & Twite, Garry, 2007.
"Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation,"
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- C. Fritz Foley & Jay C. Hartzell & Sheridan Titman & Garry Twite, 2006. "Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation," NBER Working Papers 12649, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kane, Edward J., 2001. "Dynamic inconsistency of capital forbearance: Long-run vs. short-run effects of too-big-to-fail policymaking," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 281-299, August.
- Karsten Jeske, 2005. "Private international debt with risk of repudiation," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2001-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Schwarcz Steven L., 2005. "The Confused U.S. Framework for Foreign-Bank Insolvency: An Open Research Agenda," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 81-95, April.
- Yoshinobu Zasu & Ikumi Sato, 2012. "Providing credibility around the world: effective devices of the Cape Town Convention," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 577-601, June.
- Calzolari, Giacomo & Loranth, Gyongyi, 2011.
"Regulation of multinational banks: A theoretical inquiry,"
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Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 178-198, April.
- Calzolari, Giacomo & Lóránth, Gyöngyi, 2004. "Regulation of Multinational banks: A Theoretical Inquiry," CEPR Discussion Papers 4232, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Calzolari, Giacomo & Loranth, Gyongyi, 2005. "Regulation of multinational banks: a theoretical inquiry," Working Paper Series 431, European Central Bank.
- Subramanian, Krishnamurthy V. & Tung, Frederick, 2016. "Law and Project Finance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 154-177.
More about this item
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
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