Regulation of multinational banks: A theoretical inquiry
This paper examines national regulators' incentives to intervene in a multinational bank's activities and the extent to which these incentives differ with the bank's foreign representation choice (branch or subsidiary). Shared liability leads to higher incentives for intervention than legal separation. Cross-border deposit insurance, on the other hand, yields less intervention than when regulators compensate local depositors only. Based on these results, we derive implications for multinational banks' and regulators' preference on foreign expansion and representation.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Feenstra, Robert C & Lewis, Tracy R, 1991.
"Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1287-307, November.
- Robert C. Feenstra & Tracy R. Lewis, 1987. "Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure," NBER Working Papers 2374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Viral V. Acharya, 2003.
"Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2745-2782, December.
- Acharya, Viral V, 2002. "Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3253, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester, 1993.
"A positive analysis of bank closure,"
93-10/R, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Rafael Repullo, 2000.
"Who should act as lender of last resort? an incomplete contracts model,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 580-610.
- Repullo, Rafael, 2000. "Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 580-605, August.
- Repullo, R., 1999. "Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model," Papers 9913, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
- Repullo, Rafael, 2000.
"A Model of Takeovers of Foreign Banks,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2639, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2004.
"Cooperation in international banking supervision,"
Working Paper Series
0316, European Central Bank.
- Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2005. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CEPR Discussion Papers 4990, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rønde, 2003. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CIE Discussion Papers 2004-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Gyöngyi Lóránth & Alan D. Morrison, 2007. "Deposit Insurance, Capital Regulations, and Financial Contagion in Multinational Banks," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(5-6), pages 917-949.
- Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Guzman, Andrew T, 1999.
"An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 775-808, October.
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, 2000. "An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies," NBER Working Papers 6521, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Calzolari, Giacomo & Loranth, Gyongyi, 2011.
"Regulation of multinational banks: A theoretical inquiry,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 178-198, April.
- Calzolari, Giacomo & Loranth, Gyongyi, 2005. "Regulation of multinational banks: a theoretical inquiry," Working Paper Series 0431, European Central Bank.
- Calzolari, Giacomo & Lóránth, Gyöngyi, 2004. "Regulation of Multinational banks: A Theoretical Inquiry," CEPR Discussion Papers 4232, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Giacomo Calzolari, 2004. "Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 257-282, 02.
- Charles Kahn & Andrew Winton, 2004.
"Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 59(6), pages 2531-2575, December.
- Charles M. Kahn & Andrew Winton, 2002. "Moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions," Proceedings 808, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994.
"A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/9593, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Dewatripont, Mathias & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1027-54, November.
- Xavier Freixas, 1999.
"Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity,"
Economics Working Papers
400, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- X. Freixas, 2000. "Optimal Bail Out Policy, Conditionality and Constructive Ambiguity," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 49, Netherlands Central Bank.
- Gyongyi Loranth & Alan Morrison, 2003. "Multinational Bank Capital Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects," OFRC Working Papers Series 2003fe11, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
- Buch, Claudia M. & Golder, Stefan M., 2001. "Foreign versus domestic banks in Germany and the US: a tale of two markets?," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 11(4-5), pages 341-361, December.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993.
"Protection for Sale,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February.
- Lóránth, Gyöngyi & Morrison, Alan, 2003. "Multinational Bank Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 4148, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:20:y:2011:i:2:p:178-198. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.