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Moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions

Author

Listed:
  • Charles M. Kahn
  • Andrew Winton

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles M. Kahn & Andrew Winton, 2002. "Moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions," Proceedings 808, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhpr:808
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Morrison, Alan & Lóránth, Gyöngyi, 2003. "Multinational Bank Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 4148, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Giorgio Barba Navaretti & Giacomo Calzolari & Alberto Franco Pozzolo & Micol Levi, 2010. "Multinational banking in Europe – financial stability and regulatory implications: lessons from the financial crisis [Cross subsidies, external financing constraints, and the contribution of the in," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 25(64), pages 703-753.
    3. Calzolari, Giacomo & Loranth, Gyongyi, 2011. "Regulation of multinational banks: A theoretical inquiry," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 178-198, April.

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