IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/ordojb/v66y2015i1p147-174n9.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

‚Stairway to Heaven‘ oder ‚Highway to Hell‘? – Eine Einschätzung der Europäischen Bankenunion / ‚Stairway to Heaven‘ or ‚Highway to Hell‘? – An Evaluation of the European Banking Union

Author

Listed:
  • Vollmer Uwe

Abstract

The paper describes the main pillars of the European Banking Union (EBU) and discusses its economic justification from the viewpoint of banking theory. The following aspects stand central: Avoidance of regulatory arbitrage, conflicts of interest between the monetary policy and the regulatory unit within ECB, credibility problems of bank resolution schemes, and adverse incentives of deposit insurance guarantees. The paper reviews the literature on banking regulation and scrutinizes the existing EBU-rules. It also asks what rules are missing to enhance the stability of the banking sector in Europe.

Suggested Citation

  • Vollmer Uwe, 2015. "‚Stairway to Heaven‘ oder ‚Highway to Hell‘? – Eine Einschätzung der Europäischen Bankenunion / ‚Stairway to Heaven‘ or ‚Highway to Hell‘? – An Evaluation of the European Banking Union," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 147-174, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:66:y:2015:i:1:p:147-174:n:9
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2015-0109
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/ordo-2015-0109
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/ordo-2015-0109?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks be Given to Different Agencies?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 361-378, November.
    2. International Monetary Fund, 2006. "Regulatory Capture in Banking," IMF Working Papers 2006/034, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Barth,James R. & Caprio,Gerard & Levine,Ross, 2008. "Rethinking Bank Regulation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521709309, February.
    4. Kerber Markus C., 2014. "Den Bock zum Gärtner machen? – Eine ordnungspolitische Hinterfragung der Bankenunion / ECB as single supervisory authority: Setting the fox to watch the geese?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 75-98, January.
    5. Liu, Wai-Man & Ngo, Phong, 2012. "Elections, Political Competition and Bank Failure," MPRA Paper 43603, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-1127.
    7. Buch, Claudia M. & DeLong, Gayle, 2008. "Do weak supervisory systems encourage bank risk-taking?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 23-39, April.
    8. Viral V. Acharya, 2003. "Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2745-2782, December.
    9. Acharya, Viral V. & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2007. "Too many to fail--An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-31, January.
    10. Santiago Carbo‐Valverde & Edward J. Kane & Francisco Rodriguez‐Fernandez, 2012. "Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross‐Border Banking Mergers within the EU," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(8), pages 1609-1629, December.
    11. Boyer, Pierre C. & Ponce, Jorge, 2012. "Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 206-217.
    12. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1437-1467.
    13. Michael Devereux & Niels Johannesen & John Vella, 2019. "Can Taxes Tame the Banks? Evidence from the European Bank Levies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(624), pages 3058-3091.
    14. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Edward J. Kane, 2002. "Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 175-195, Spring.
    15. Ralf Bebenroth & Diemo Dietrich & Uwe Vollmer, 2009. "Bank regulation and supervision in bank-dominated financial systems: a comparison between Japan and Germany," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 177-209, April.
    16. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2008. "Microeconomics of Banking, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262062704.
    17. Jan Pieter Krahnen, 2013. "Rettung durch Regulierung? Eckpunkte des Liikanen-Berichts," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(3-4), pages 167-185, August.
    18. Masami Imai, 2009. "Political Influence and Declarations of Bank Insolvency in Japan," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(1), pages 131-158, February.
    19. Lucca, David & Seru, Amit & Trebbi, Francesco, 2014. "The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 17-32.
    20. Halling, Michael & Pichler, Pegaret & Stomper, Alex, 2016. "The Politics of Related Lending," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 333-358, February.
    21. Gerhard Schwödiauer, 2013. "Zusammenfassende Anmerkungen zur Debatte über die „Europäische Bankenunion“," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 14(3-4), pages 233-239, August.
    22. Craig O. Brown & I. Serdar Dinç, 2005. "The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1413-1444.
    23. Ignatowski, Magdalena & Korte, Josef, 2014. "Wishful thinking or effective threat? Tightening bank resolution regimes and bank risk-taking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 264-281.
    24. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February.
    25. Calzolari, Giacomo & Loranth, Gyongyi, 2011. "Regulation of multinational banks: A theoretical inquiry," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 178-198, April.
    26. Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rønde, 2003. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CIE Discussion Papers 2004-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    27. G. Andrew Karolyi & Alvaro G. Taboada, 2015. "Regulatory Arbitrage and Cross‐Border Bank Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(6), pages 2395-2450, December.
    28. Di Noia, Carmine & Di Giorgio, Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 361-378, November.
    29. Martin Hellwig, 2010. "Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(02), pages 40-46, July.
    30. Kane, Edward J., 2001. "Dynamic inconsistency of capital forbearance: Long-run vs. short-run effects of too-big-to-fail policymaking," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 281-299, August.
    31. Joel F. Houston & Chen Lin & Yue Ma, 2012. "Regulatory Arbitrage and International Bank Flows," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(5), pages 1845-1895, October.
    32. Sumit Agarwal & David Lucca & Amit Seru & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 129(2), pages 889-938.
    33. Thomas Harr & Thomas Rønde, 2006. "Regulation of Banking Groups," FRU Working Papers 2006/01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Finance Research Unit.
    34. Dietrich, Diemo & Vollmer, Uwe, 2012. "Are universal banks bad for financial stability? Germany during the world financial crisis," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 123-134.
    35. Roland Vaubel, 2013. "Probleme der Bankenunion: Falsche Lehren aus der Krise," Credit and Capital Markets, Credit and Capital Markets, vol. 46(3), pages 281-302.
    36. Buch, Claudia M. & Hilberg, Björn & Tonzer, Lena, 2016. "Taxing banks: An evaluation of the German bank levy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 52-66.
    37. repec:ces:ifodic:v:8:y:2010:i:2:p:14566986 is not listed on IDEAS
    38. Judit Temesvary, 2015. "The Role of Regulatory Arbitrage in U.S. Banks’ International Lending Flows: Bank-Level Evidence," FIW Working Paper series 151, FIW.
    39. Kevin Young, 2012. "Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 663-688.
    40. Martin Hellwig, 2010. "Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(2), pages 40-46, 07.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Boyer, Pierre C. & Kempf, Hubert, 2020. "Regulatory arbitrage and the efficiency of banking regulation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    2. Vollmer Uwe, 2016. "The Asymmetric Implementation of the European Banking Union (EBU): Consequences for Financial Stability," International Journal of Management and Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, vol. 50(1), pages 7-26, June.
    3. Marcelo Rezende, 2011. "How do joint supervisors examine financial institutions? the case of state banks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2011-43, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Ampudia, Miguel & Beck, Thorsten & Beyer, Andreas & Colliard, Jean-Edouard & Leonello, Agnese & Maddaloni, Angela & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2019. "The architecture of supervision," Working Paper Series 2287, European Central Bank.
    5. Nicolò Fraccaroli, 2019. "Supervisory Governance, Capture and Non-Performing Loans," CEIS Research Paper 471, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 08 Oct 2019.
    6. Holopainen, Helena, 2007. "Integration of financial supervision," Research Discussion Papers 12/2007, Bank of Finland.
    7. Buck, Florian & Schliephake, Eva, 2013. "The regulator’s trade-off: Bank supervision vs. minimum capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4584-4598.
    8. Friederike Niepmann & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013. "Bank Bailouts, International Linkages, and Cooperation," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 270-305, November.
    9. Florian Buck & Eva Schliephake, 2012. "The Regulator's Trade-off: Bank Supervision vs. Minimum Capital," CESifo Working Paper Series 3923, CESifo.
    10. Lim, Ivan & Hagendorff, Jens & Armitage, Seth, 2019. "Is the fox guarding the henhouse? Bankers in the Federal Reserve, bank leverage and risk-shifting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 478-504.
    11. Haselmann, Rainer & Kick, Thomas & Behn, Markus & Vig, Vikrant, 2015. "The Political Economy of Bank Bailouts," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113082, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    12. Hardy, Daniel C. & Nieto, Maria J., 2011. "Cross-border coordination of prudential supervision and deposit guarantees," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 155-164, August.
    13. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans & Papageorgiou, Stylianos, 2020. "Regulatory competition in banking: Curse or blessing?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    14. Buck, Florian & Schliephake, Eva, 2012. "Political Economy of Banking Regulation," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62018, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    15. Frame, W. Scott & Mihov, Atanas & Sanz, Leandro, 2020. "Foreign Investment, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Risk of U.S. Banking Organizations," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(3), pages 955-988, May.
    16. Koetter, Michael & Popov, Alexander, 2018. "Politics, banks, and sub-sovereign debt: unholy trinity or divine coincidence?," Working Paper Series 2146, European Central Bank.
    17. Marcelo Rezende, 2011. "How Do Joint Supervisors Examine Financial Institutions? The Case of Banks," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 18, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Demirguc-Kunt,Asli & Horvath,Balint Laszlo & Huizinga,Harry P., 2019. "Regulatory Arbitrage and Cross-Border Syndicated Loans," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9037, The World Bank.
    19. Carlos Altavilla & Miguel Boucinha & José-Luis Peydró & Frank Smets, 2019. "Banking supervision, monetary policy and risk-taking: Big data evidence from 15 credit registers," Economics Working Papers 1684, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 2020.
    20. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2013. "Regulatory Capture by Sophistication," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79991, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:66:y:2015:i:1:p:147-174:n:9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.