How do joint supervisors examine financial institutions? the case of state banks
This paper studies what determines whether federal and state supervisors examine state banks independently or together. The results suggest that supervisors coordinate examinations in order to support states with lower budgets and capabilities and more banks to supervise. I find that states with larger budgets examine more banks independently, that they accommodate changes in the number of banks mostly through the number of examinations with a federal supervisor and that, when examining banks together, state banking departments that have earned quality accreditation are more likely to write conclusion reports separately from federal supervisors. The results also indicate that regulation impacts supervision by changing the characteristics of banks. Independent examinations decrease with branch deregulation, which is consistent with the facts that this reform consolidated banks within fewer independent firms and that state and federal supervisors are more likely to examine large and complex institutions together.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.federalreserve.gov/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/fedsorder.html|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February.
- Beverly J. Hirtle & Jose A. Lopez, 1999. "Supervisory information and the frequency of bank examinations," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 1-20.
- Bent E. Sørensen & Yuliya Demyanyk & Charlotte Ostergaard, 2005.
"U.S. Banking Deregulation, Small Businesses,and Interstate Insurance of Personal Income,"
2005-02, Department of Economics, University of Houston.
- Yuliya Demyanyk & Charlotte Ostergaard & Bent E. Sørensen, 2007. "U.S. Banking Deregulation, Small Businesses, and Interstate Insurance of Personal Income," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(6), pages 2763-2801, December.
- Yuliya Demyanyk & Charlotte Ostergaard & Bent E. Sørensen, 2006. "FU.S. banking deregulation, small businesses, and interstate insurance of personal income," Working Paper 2006/09, Norges Bank.
- Demyanyk, Yuliya & Ostergaard, Charlotte & Sørensen, Bent E, 2006. "US Banking Deregulation, Small Businesses and Interstate Insurance of Personal Income," CEPR Discussion Papers 5863, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Craig O. Brown & I. Serdar Dinç, 2005. "The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1413-1444, November.
- Dirk Schoenmaker & Paolo Dasgupta & Charles Goodhart, 2001.
"The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and Supervisors,"
FMG Discussion Papers
dp377, Financial Markets Group.
- Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker & Paolo Dasgupta, 2001. "The skill profile of central bankers and supervisors," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25052, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2005.
"Cooperation in International Banking Supervision,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4990, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Holthausen, Cornelia & Rønde, Thomas, 2004. "Cooperation in international banking supervision," Working Paper Series 0316, European Central Bank.
- Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rønde, 2003. "Cooperation in International Banking Supervision," CIE Discussion Papers 2004-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Eisenbeis, Robert A. & Kaufman, George G., 2008. "Cross-border banking and financial stability in the EU," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 168-204, September.
- Kahn, Charles M. & Santos, Joao A.C., 2005.
"Allocating bank regulatory powers: Lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2107-2136, November.
- Charles M. Kahn & João A. C. Santos, 2001. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance and supervision," BIS Working Papers 102, Bank for International Settlements.
- Charles M. Kahn & João A.C. Santos, 2001. "Allocating bank regulatory powers: lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and supervision," Proceedings 717, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Edward J. Kane & Rosalind Bennett & Robert Oshinsky, 2008. "Evidence of Improved Monitoring and Insolvency Resolution after FDICIA," NBER Working Papers 14576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward J. Kane, 2005.
"Confronting Divergent Interests in Cross-Country Regulatory Arrangements,"
NBER Working Papers
11865, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward J. Kane, 2006. "Confronting divergent interests in cross-country regulatory arrangements," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 69, pages 12p., June.
- Linda Allen & Julapa Jagtiani & James Moser, 2001. "Further Evidence on the Information Content of Bank Examination Ratings: A Study of BHC-to-FHC Conversion Applications," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 213-232, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2011-43. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kris Vajs)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.