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Confronting divergent interests in cross-country regulatory arrangements

  • Edward J. Kane

    (Reserve Bank of New Zealand)

This article was prepared by Professor Kane for a public lecture while he was the Professorial Fellow of Monetary and Financial Economics at Victoria University in 2005. Prudential regulation seeks to assure the safety and soundness of the financial sector. The article considers the regulation of banks operating in both Australia and New Zealand. It discusses differences in the regulatory cultures of the two countries, and identifies preconditions for arriving at a fair and harmonised system of regulation. A harmonised regulatory regime is one that maximises the welfare of the citizens across countries, rather than simply blending together two national regulatory regimes. The article stresses the importance of proper processes for the resolution of incentive conflicts between countries that may arise in regulation and crisis situations.

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Article provided by Reserve Bank of New Zealand in its journal Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 69 (2006)
Issue (Month): (June)
Pages: 12p.

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Handle: RePEc:nzb:nzbbul:june2006:2
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  1. Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton & Steven Fries, 1999. "Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 51-, March.
  2. Gerard Caprio & Patrick Honohan, 2008. "Banking Crises," Center for Development Economics 2008-09, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  3. Schüler, Martin, 2003. "Incentive Problems in Banking Supervision: The European Case," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-62, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  4. Altunbas, Yener & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2004. "Mergers and acquisitions and bank performance in Europe: the role of strategic similarities," Working Paper Series 0398, European Central Bank.
  5. Peter Ledingham, 1995. "The review of bank supervision arrangements in New Zealand: the main elements of the debate," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 58, September.
  6. Geof Mortlock, 2003. "New Zealand's financial sector regulation," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 66, December.
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