IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Resolution of failed banks by deposit insurers : cross-country evidence

Listed author(s):
  • Beck, Thorsten
  • Laeven, Luc

There is a wide cross-country variation in the institutional structure of bank failure resolution, including the role of the deposit insurer. The authors use quantitative analysis for 57 countries and discuss specific country cases to illustrate this variation. Using data for over 1,700 banks across 57 countries, they show that banks in countries where the deposit insurer has the responsibility of intervening failed banks and the power to revoke membership in the deposit insurance scheme are more stable and less likely to become insolvent. Involvement of the deposit insurer in bank failure resolution thus dampens the negative effect that deposit insurance has on banks'risk taking.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/05/11/000016406_20060511121345/Rendered/PDF/wps3920.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3920.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 May 2006
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3920
Contact details of provider: Postal:
1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433

Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Gianni De Nicolo, 2000. "Size, charter value and risk in banking: an international perspective," International Finance Discussion Papers 689, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  2. Laeven, Luc, 2004. "The political economy of deposit insurance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3247, The World Bank.
  3. Levine, Ross, 2002. "Bank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which Is Better?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 398-428, October.
  4. Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, 2006. "U.S. corporate and bank insolvency regimes: an economic comparison and evaluation," Working Paper Series WP-06-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  5. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, "undated". "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services', Political Action Committees," CRSP working papers 465, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  6. Beck, Thorsten, 2001. "Deposit insurance as private club - Is Germany a model?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2559, The World Bank.
  7. Claessens, Stijn & Klapper, Leora F., 2002. "Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations of its Relative Use," CEI Working Paper Series 2002-17, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  8. Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Patrick Honohan, 2008. "Banking Crises," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp242, IIIS.
  9. Beck, Thorsten, 2003. "The incentive-compatible design of deposit insurance and bank failure resolution : concepts and country studies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3043, The World Bank.
  10. Michael P. Dooley & Jeffrey A. Frankel, 2003. "Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number dool03-1.
  11. Armen Hovakimian & Edward J. Kane & Luc Laeven, 2002. "How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting," NBER Working Papers 9322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Benston, George J & Kaufman, George G, 1996. "The Appropriate Role of Bank Regulation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(436), pages 688-697, May.
  13. Oliver Hart, 2006. "Different approaches to bankruptcy," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(1), pages 3-8, 04.
  14. Armen Hovakimian & Edward Kane & Luc Laeven, 2003. "How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 23(3), pages 177-204, June.
  15. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Edward J. Kane, 2002. "Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 175-195, Spring.
  16. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, 2000. "Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?," IMF Working Papers 00/3, International Monetary Fund.
  17. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Karacaovali, Baybars & Laeven, Luc, 2005. "Deposit insurance around the world : a comprehensive database," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3628, The World Bank.
  18. Edward J. Kane & Berry Wilson, 1998. "A contracting-theory intepretation of the origins of Federal deposit insurance," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Aug, pages 573-595.
  19. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 2002. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1373-1406, October.
  20. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-419, June.
  21. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2004. "Market discipline and deposit insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 375-399, March.
  22. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1437-1467.
  23. Thorsten Beck & Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Ross Levine, 2005. "Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending," NBER Working Papers 11498, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Clas Wihlborg & Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, 2001. "Infrastructure Requirements in the Area of Bankruptcy Law," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 01-09, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  25. Hannan, Timothy H & Hanweck, Gerald A, 1988. "Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large Certificates of Deposit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 203-211, May.
  26. Mayes, David G., 2004. "Who pays for bank insolvency?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 515-551, April.
  27. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Klapper, Leora, 1999. "Resolution of corporate distress - evidence from East Asia's financial crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2133, The World Bank.
  28. Honohan,Patrick & Laeven,Luc (ed.), 2005. "Systemic Financial Crises," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521851855, May.
  29. Gilson, Stuart C & Hotchkiss, Edith S & Ruback, Richard S, 2000. "Valuation of Bankrupt Firms," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(1), pages 43-74.
  30. Luc Laeven, 2002. "Bank Risk and Deposit Insurance," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 16(1), pages 109-137, June.
  31. Ronn, Ehud I & Verma, Avinash K, 1986. " Pricing Risk-Adjusted Deposit Insurance: An Option-Based Model," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(4), pages 871-895, September.
  32. Boyd, John H. & Graham, Stanley L. & Hewitt, R. Shawn, 1993. "Bank holding company mergers with nonbank financial firms: Effects on the risk of failure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 43-63, February.
  33. Luc Laeven, 2004. "The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 26(3), pages 201-224, December.
  34. Stijn Claessens & Daniela Klingebiel & Luc Laeven, 2001. "Financial Restructuring in Banking and Corporate Sector Crises: What Policies to Pursue?," NBER Working Papers 8386, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  35. Edward I. Altman, 1968. "Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis And The Prediction Of Corporate Bankruptcy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 23(4), pages 589-609, 09.
  36. Honohan, Patrick & Klingebiel, Daniela, 2003. "The fiscal cost implications of an accommodating approach to banking crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(8), pages 1539-1560, August.
  37. De La Torre,Augusto, 2000. "Resolving bank failures in Argentina - recent developments and issues," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2295, The World Bank.
  38. Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, 1995. "The finance-growth nexus: evidence from bank branch deregulation," Research Paper 9513, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3920. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.